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## Feeling

In sensation mind is passive, receptive, unorganized, aimed at the individual, dispersed in a manifold. Its content is merely found within itself, not freely created by it. Feeling is the first step toward the free, creative, thinking mind, but it is only the first step, the introduction of the barest unity into the manifold of sensation. We have several more levels to move through before we reach normal perception.

The distinction between sensation and feeling is never given an extremely clear formulation and is not to be found in Hegel's work before the third edition of the *Encyclopedia*. I believe that this distinction was one that Hegel was led to in his later years in order to preserve the pure immediacy, singularity, and lack of universality of sensations themselves. In the earlier version of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* Hegel talks of sensation more loosely, allowing the concept to stray from its defining relation to singularity. I argue here that the distinction between a sensation and a feeling is simply that a feeling is a sensation that has a place in a very low-level, basic, organized system of sensations.<sup>1</sup>

The fuzziness of his early concept of sensation led Hegel to see that he needed an intermediate stage at which sensations could

1. This might seem to conflict with the position I have taken on the nature of sensation's content, for attributing content to a sensation presupposes its participation in a system sufficiently organized to map a quality-space. In feeling, however, the relevant system must be of much greater scope than simply a mapped quality-space; it is the total system of all the animal's sensations.

acquire some of the characteristics of the universal. This could be accomplished if they were to occupy a place in a system and thereby acquire a functional role within that system, because then the particular sensation loses importance in contrast to the role it plays—and roles are universals and can be taken by many different role players. Feeling, however, is still not explicitly cognitive, and the sensations are not organized yet through the conceptual categories that we meet in the Phenomenology:

The sensing of the *universal* seems to involve a contradiction, for as we know, sensation as such has as its content only that which is single. What we call the *feeling* soul does not involve this contradiction however, for it is neither confined to the *immediate sensuousness* of sensation and dependent upon the *immediate sensuousness* of what is present, nor does it relate itself to the *wholly universal being* which can be grasped only through the mediation of pure *thought*. It has, on the contrary, a content which has not yet developed into the separation of the universal and the singular, the subjective and the objective. . . . This content still relates itself to the feeling soul as accidents do to substance; the soul still appears as the subject and central point of all determinations of content, as the power which dominates the world of feeling in an immediate manner. (§402, *Zusatz*)

#### THE ROLE OF FEELING

Feeling is still clearly an animal function; it is not confined to humans. As the mention of sense and feeling in the *Philosophy of Nature* (§356ff.) makes clear, the functions of these powers of the animal soul are directed toward enabling the animal organism to maintain itself within, but also over against, its environment.

The medievals noticed that on the basis of mere sensation the animal cannot be expected to succeed in its efforts to preserve itself, and that we cannot explain animal behavior solely by reference to the pure data of sense. As Aquinas says, "The sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not because of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy" (*Summa Theologica*, q. 78, art. 4). There must be some synthetic activity of the animal beyond even that of the common sense to account for the animal's behavior. Yet the medievals could not go

so far as to attribute intellect to animals. They solved the puzzle by postulating an *estimative power*, which apprehended nonsensible properties of things. To explain similar unthinking behavior patterns in man, Aquinas postulates the same power, but calls it instead the *cogitative power*. This was also called *particular reason*, "for it compares individual intentions [objects of mind], just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions." Gardeil says of this *ratio particularis* that, "in general, its function consists in being a sort of mediating faculty between sense on the one hand, which grasps the material singular, and intellect on the other hand, which is the faculty of the abstracted essence. Thus, it serves to prepare the immediate phantasms for the consideration of the intellect."<sup>2</sup> This *vis aestimativa* is grouped by Aquinas with common sense, imagination, fantasy, and memory as an internal sense.

The feeling soul plays a role in Hegel's theory of mind similar to that played by the estimative power in Aquinas's theory. The feeling soul is a nonintellectual, immediate synthesis of the sensory material. Unlike Aquinas, Hegel takes imagination and memory to be powers of the intellect and treats them in the Psychology. Yet, although he deals with these powers or activities of the mind explicitly as operations of the intellect, it is clear that Hegel uses the capacities of the feeling soul to account for some things we might normally attribute to imagination or memory. In *Feeling*, Hegel considers those powers of the soul which, to use Aquinas's phrase, are "a preamble to the intellect."

Hegel's concept of feeling is one of the earliest modern attempts we can find to work out a theory of our preconscious mental activity. But there is a constant danger in reading Hegel's texts and thinking about his examples, for there is no purely preconscious human behavior that has not been transformed by our consciousness and our thought. Hegel devotes much attention to pathological and abnormal phenomena in the Anthropology, where feeling is discussed. This is certainly not because feeling is itself something pathological or abnormal, but because it is in such cases that the otherwise buried preconscious activities produce a noticeable ef-

2. H. P. Gardeil, *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 3: *Psychology*, pp. 75-76.

fect. Inferring the existence and nature of unconscious psychological activities from the data of pathology is today a standard practice. But when we read his discussion of a pathological phenomenon with which he wants to illustrate some aspect of feeling and in turn to explain the phenomenon with that concept, we must be careful not to think that the person involved is operating solely at the level of feeling. Perhaps there are some morons who, Hegel would say, have not progressed beyond the animal stage of feeling, but normally humans are well beyond that stage, and the phenomena peculiar to feeling make their appearance only in abnormal circumstances—in cases where, due to a breakdown in these lower, pre-conscious functions of mind, the higher, truer being of the spiritual is not achieved. It is sometimes hard to know which aspects of the case belong to feeling.

For observation the concrete nature of spirit carries with it the peculiar difficulty that the particular stages and determinations of the development of its concept do not remain behind as particular existences over against its deeper forms. . . . The determinations and stages of spirit, in contrast, remain essentially as only moments, states, or determinations at the higher stages of development. It thereby happens that the higher shows itself empirically present in a lower, more abstract determination. (§380, my tr.)

Although it [the feeling soul] is therefore entirely formal, it is of particular interest insofar as it has being *as form*, and so appears as a *state* (§380) into which the development of the soul may relapse after having advanced to the determination of consciousness and understanding. (§404)

## FEELING AND THE SELF

The notion of the self enters Hegel's discussions of feeling in two different ways. First, he claims that the notion of a self is intimately bound up with the notion of the feeling soul: "Sensation involves sensitivity, and there is reason for maintaining therefore, that while sensation puts more emphasis upon the passive aspect of feeling,

upon *finding*, i.e., upon the immediacy of feeling's determinateness, feeling refers more to the self-hood involved here" (§402).

That the concept of the self is emphasized in feeling as opposed to sensation is quite clear, given my interpretation of feeling. Sensations considered as such exhibit no organization; organization first appears in feeling. But until some at least rudimentary organization appears among the sensations, there is no sense in talking of a self. Sensations, furthermore, do not simply fall into organized patterns; they have to be organized into them. Spirit, in this case as soul, is the organizer.

Feeling is therefore the other side, the active side, of sensation and is as much animal as human, for the animal soul must also bring the sensations into a unitary self to be said to have sensation at all. Nonetheless, there are considerable differences between the nature of the connectedness an animal can give its sensations and that given by humans to their sensations, both because humans can do more than feel and because, due to their higher capacities that need to be embodied in feeling, they have feelings of which animals are not capable. Feeling is the preconscious organization of sensation, a "blind but indispensable function of the soul," which is the presupposition, but not the actuality, of having a concept of the subjective and the objective, and a presupposition of having the concept of self.

In the later stages of the dialectic in the *Phenomenology* and *Intuition* there are categorial requirements on the way sensation is organized, but this is not the case here. There are, however, some pragmatic requirements on the organization—namely, that it by and large suffice to enable the animal to maneuver successfully in its environment. But this does not require the animal to organize its sensations through *concepts*. Only certain success-promoting *patterns* of response to the environment are called for. In feeling, the soul does not construct a spatio temporally extended, law-governed, physical world of experience over against itself on the basis of the material provided by sensation—such a construction would involve making use of those categories, universal rules of construction, which characterize the higher stages of consciousness and intuition.

Although we can, from the third-person perspective, already

start applying the notion of a self to the feeling soul, without the feeling soul's having any such concept itself, Hegel does attribute a minimal, nonobjective awareness of self to the feeling soul, which he calls self-feeling [*Selbstgefühl*]:<sup>3</sup>

As individuality, the feeling totality is essentially an internal division of itself and an awakening to the *Urtheil* [the judgment, the basic division] within itself in accordance with which it has particular feelings and as a subject stands in relation to these its determinations. The subject as such posits these within itself as its feelings. It is sunken into the particularity of these sensations, and at the same time it unites with itself therein as a subjective unity through the ideality of the particular. In this way it is self-feeling—and it is at the same time only in the particular feeling. (§407, my tr.)

Self-feeling is a problematic concept, for how can a being have a concept of self without having the concept of the non-self, and in particular the concept of an external world, which we know the feeling soul does not have? But this question itself is misleading in that it presupposes that in self-feeling we are concerned with a *concept* of self. Such, I want to argue, is not the case.

The only contrast available to the feeling soul on the basis of which it could have something that deserves to be called a feeling of self is that between its own contents and itself, the possessor of those contents. The feeling soul cannot assign some contents to itself and some to something else, for that would be equivalent to positing an external world, so self-feeling is not a matter of classifying feelings into two different kinds, feelings of self and feelings of not-self. But the contrast between itself and its contents is not a contrast that exhibits itself in the sensations or feelings themselves. Since all feelings are its own, in every feeling the soul is feeling itself, is self-feeling.

The soul is not a totally passive receptor, however; as we have seen, its own state is a significant factor in its sensibility, and quite naturally the forms of organization present in the feeling soul are significant determinants of the higher-level organization of its sen-

3. Petry translates this, incorrectly I think, as "self-awareness." The connotations of this translation are too cognitive, for in self-feeling we are certainly not aware of a self as a self.

sible states. Self-feeling is present in every feeling, because the organization of the whole, already present in the feeling soul, is a determinant of each feeling: "We have before us here feeling subjectivity; it realizes itself, is active, emerges from simple unity as liveliness. This activity belongs to the determination of liveliness; it awakens the opposition in itself, but it sublates and preserves it thereby, giving itself self-feeling, giving itself determinate being" (*PSS*, vol. 2, p. 325; my tr.).<sup>4</sup> The soul feels itself in every feeling insofar as the content of the particular feeling, determined as it is in part by the total organization in which it participates, implies that total organization, the self.

Hegel applies the notion of self-feeling to the explanation of mental illness. Mental illness, he says, is the pathological dominance of this lower level of spirit. Hegel's reasoning is something like this. The sane subject is the one who has a solid understanding of its world and its place in it; it lives in a well-ordered world. Any subject has certainly progressed far enough that it possesses the categorial structure necessary to having a concept of self, but in derangement it puts its self-feeling in its place. This means that, rather than constructing an objective world in accordance with the categories of the understanding, it takes the immediate unity found in its feelings to be objective itself, removing its thinking from the constraints of the objective world.

As healthy and self-possessed the subject has the present consciousness of the ordered totality of its individual world and it subsumes into that system each particular content of sensation, representation, desire, inclination that occurs and it classifies them in the proper place.

Caught in a particular determinateness, however, it does not assign such a content the proper place and rank that belongs to it in the individual world system that is a subject. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction to the totality systematized in its consciousness and to the particular determinateness that neither flows with nor is classified or ranked within that totality—derangement. (§408, my tr.)

4. This passage is given in Petry's text as a *Zusatz* to §407, but it is not one of the *Zusätze* supplied in the original posthumous edition by Boumann. No other edition of the *Encyclopedia* gives a *Zusatz* for §407. This passage comes from Griesheim's notes. Parallel passages in other manuscripts authenticate it. See Petry's apparatus, *PSS*, vol. 2, p. 325.

Yet, if derangement were a matter of inconsistency in one's beliefs, there would seem to be no difference between error and insanity:

I can, of course, be mistaken about myself as well as about the external world. People of no understanding have empty, subjective representations, unfulfillable wishes that they nonetheless hope to realize in the future. They restrict themselves to totally singular goals and interests, hold fast to one-sided principles, come into conflict with actuality. But neither this narrowmindedness nor this error are yet deranged as long as the benighted still know that their subjective representation does not yet exist objectively. Error and folly become derangement only when someone takes his merely subjective representation to be objectively present and holds to it in the face of the objective reality that contradicts it. (§408, *Zusatz*, my tr.)

There is no clear line between stubborn error and derangement, and we cannot, in the very nature of things, confront anyone with the independent, objective truth. Self-feeling has the upper hand when it is untempered by the complex principles of the understanding and tries to maintain its simple organization in the face of a world incoherent with it. "Consequently, when someone speaks in a deranged manner, one should always begin by reminding him of his overall situation, his concrete actuality. If, when he is brought to consider and to be aware of this objective context, he still fails to relinquish his false presentation, there can be no doubt that he is in a state of derangement" (§408, *Zusatz*).

#### THE SOUL'S RELATION TO REALITY

The most puzzling aspect of the soul as Hegel describes it in the Anthropology is its ontological status and its relation to the rest of reality. Early in the Anthropology, "soul" is treated almost like a mass term—soul does not come in packaged units but is the "ideality" of nature in general. In the progress of the Anthropology the soul is supposed to crystallize, as it were, into separate individualities. Yet even in the relatively late stages of feeling and habit this individualization is not absolute; the boundaries between otherwise distinct persons can still be violated, for example, by two different persons sharing the same sensation. "The soul is truly

immaterial, even in its concreteness, and proof that it is capable of this *substantial identity* with another is to be found in the somnambulant [hypnotized] individual's sensing within itself the tastes and smells present within the individual to whom it is thus related. . . . In this substantial identity, consciousness has only one subjectivity" (§406). Similarly, Hegel talks of the feeling soul having an immediate access to the whole world, so that one can have direct feelings (one is tempted to say "intuitions," but not as Hegel uses that term) of spatially distant objects and events without, apparently, any objective, causal chain mediating between the event and the feeling: "With regard, firstly, to what is spatially distant from us, insofar as we are conscious and awake, we can only know something of it on condition that we sublimate the distance in a *mediate* manner. The *envisioning soul* is not bound by this condition however. Space is of *external nature*, not of the *soul*, and in that it is apprehended by the soul this externality ceases to be spatial, for it is no longer external either to itself or us once the ideality of the soul has transformed it" (§406, *Zusatz*).

Hegel wants a peculiar double status for the soul. He wants it to be individuated by persons and their bodies for some purposes, so that, for example, it makes sense to speak of states of the soul (sensations, feelings, etc.) as having an owner, being *someone's* states. For other purposes, for example, explaining the phenomena of national character or clairvoyance and hypnotism, he wants soul to be something shareable across persons, the "ideality" of a much larger piece of the world than just a single body.<sup>5</sup>

Hegel cannot have it both ways. When he treats the soul as a supraindividual reality, he seems to have to treat its states, in

5. Hegel not only deals with derangement in his discussion of feeling but also discusses hypnosis, clairvoyance, and other psychic phenomena. At the turn of the nineteenth century, before the rise of modern psychology, before modern biology, a theory with no room for such phenomena was in trouble. "Confirmation of the factual aspect could appear to be the primary need. For those from whom it might be required it would be superfluous however, since they simplify their consideration of the matter by dismissing accounts of it as delusion and imposture, infinitely numerous though they are, and accredited by the education, character, etc. of the witnesses. They are so set in their apriori understanding, that it is not only immune to all evidence, but they have even denied what they have seen with their own eyes. . . . Comprehension of it is impossible insofar as one presupposes personalities independent of one another and of the content as an objective world, and assumes spatial and material extrinsicality to be generally absolute" (§406).

particular sensations and feelings, as quite independent entities in their own right; the boundaries of the soul are wide because souls are simply conglomerations of sensations. Thus two people can share the same sensation; sensations are Humean, the soul is a bundle of such states, and, since the grouping principle is not spatial, the same sensation can be in two different bundles. But a bundle theory of the soul comports ill with the alleged singularity and unity of the soul and clearly violates the progression of the Anthropology from soul as a general existent standing over against nature as a whole to something singularized in individual souls and individual sensations.

Hegel tries to combine the generality and the individuality of the soul by describing it as a monad, an individual that nonetheless contains a complete world. Leibnizian monads are active and generate the whole world in representation from within themselves. Similarly, the soul is (though admittedly only potentially) the locus of the whole world, a "featureless mine" out of which the entire world can be generated or brought to light.

The filling of the soul has yet another aspect however, for apart from this material [sensation], as an actual individuality we are also *implicitly a world* of concrete content with an infinite periphery, and have within us a numberless multitude of relations and connections, which even if it does not enter into our sensation and presentation is always within us, and still belongs to the concrete content of the human soul regardless of the extent to which these relations are able to change constantly even without our knowing of it. On account of its infinite wealth of content, the human soul may be said to be the soul of a world, the *individually determined world-soul*. Since the human soul is a *singularity*, determined in all its aspects and therefore *limited*, it also relates itself to a universe determined in accordance with its *individual* standpoint. That by which the soul is confronted is by no means a being external to it, for the totality of relationships within which the individual human soul finds itself is rather the actual life and subjectivity of this universe. (§402, *Zusatz*)

In another place Hegel says, "The *concrete* being of an individual involves the entirety of its basic interests, of the essential and

particular empirical relationships in which he stands to other people and the world at large" (§406).

This comparison of the soul to a monad limps badly, for a monad is a complete world in representation only. But the notion of representation does not have clear application in the realm of soul, for the soul is supposed to be pre-representational. The fact that Hegel attributes content to feelings inevitably forces us toward interpreting them as representational states. Yet the categorial (and syntactic) structures necessary for being truly representational are lacking. There is a weaker sense of representation according to which anything registering a feature of the world in some law-governed fashion can be said to represent that feature—this is the sense in which sensations represent the properties of physical objects. But feelings are supposed to be more complex than sensations, without achieving the status of representations in the full sense.

What Hegel could be getting at is puzzling, but the interpretation I have been developing casts some interesting light. Hegel seems to be denying that the state of one's body is the sole important factor in determining the state of the soul. We earlier described sensations as being, in the first place, the being-for-mind of states of the sensory organs. But here, in feeling, where such states begin to acquire a meaning in virtue of their participation in an organized system, we find that the scope of the factors relevant to that organization goes far beyond the immediate state of the sensory organs. The soul, as a totality, includes as part of its "filling" everything relevant to it.

One way to uncover what Hegel might be driving at here is to return to our suggestion that the spiritual supervenes upon the material. The point has been made several times by those investigating the supervenience relation that mental facts, if supervenient upon the physical, must supervene upon very large sets of physical facts; not even an exhaustive set of physical facts about one person's body would suffice to determine that person's mental states.<sup>6</sup> Hegel may be making a similar point here. What he calls the

6. See Burge, "Individualism and the Mental"; idem., "Other Bodies"; Garfield, "Propositional Attitudes and the Ontology of the Mental." But notice that the arguments given in this literature all explicitly concern intentional, representational mental states. It remains an open question whether the individuation of sensations or feelings is individualistic.

concrete being of a soul involves virtually the entire world and in such a way that it need not enter into sensation or representation. The soul is to be thought of as the ideality of this broad-ranging "world" of facts, and I think we can take this to mean that the soul supervenes upon this whole "world." In the interpretation of someone's feelings, which involves the specification of their role in the unconscious organizational pattern of the soul, it is this world that forms the appropriate background for the interpretation. In hypnosis and clairvoyance, sensations and feelings occur which Hegel believes can only be appropriately interpreted as being the immediate appearance to the mind of some event or object to which there can be no normal, causally mediated perceptual access. Should a woman have a sudden image of her husband dying and experience a feeling of loss, when at that moment her husband is in fact dying in an army hospital on a distant continent, Hegel might be perfectly willing to countenance the possibility of some fairly mundane explanation of the image and feeling—that it was occasioned perhaps by a piece of spoiled mustard taken at dinner. But he would object to an insistence that this must be all there is to the occurrence, for such an insistence humbles the soul to a mere upshot of the corporeal. One's bodily states are causally coherent, but the states of one's soul are not subject to that same requirement, for, as nonspatial and immaterial, they lack the proper ontological presuppositions for causal interaction. The net of events relevant to the interpretation of a spiritual event is wider than the immediate causal substratum.

Another way to put this is that what counts as a coherent explanatory account of our feelings is not logically required to coincide with the causal account of our sensory states. Our feelings are explained by an interpretation against the background of our "concrete being," the entirety of our basic interests and so forth. In our example, we are not logically required to insist that what the woman felt was a bit of spoiled mustard, and to do so is to misunderstand the relative priorities of spirit and matter. In the long run, it may well be more enlightening to regard the occurrence as a case of immediate spiritual contact between loved ones. The spoiled mustard would, as it were, sink to an enabling condition.

Hegel seems to be assuming that we are implicitly representing the entire supervenience base, and this is a mistake. The superven-

nience base determines the character of our representation, no doubt, but we cannot infer that we are therefore constantly, though only implicitly, representing the entire base in such a way as to be able to call up distant portions of it directly on occasion. Hegel appears to be taking the relation between nature and spirit, which I have classified as a supervenience relation, to be the relation of *expression*. Just as the Leibnizian monad expresses the world from a certain point of view, the Hegelian soul expresses the world from a point of view. My feelings are the expression of my entire concrete actuality, my world. And indeed, the correct description of numerous feelings depends on my broader situation—on, for example, the difference between pride and false pride or anger and righteous indignation. But it seems illegitimate to move from the fact that my mental states, at whatever level of description, have a broad supervenience base that extends far beyond my own body to the idea that spatial determinations have no true reality for souls or persons, that souls are expressions of the whole world from a point of view. “Expression” itself also has a weak and a strong sense. In the weak sense, expression is just reliable indication; in the strong sense it involves full representation. Feelings can express the world at most in the weak sense—yet Hegel decries their unreliability. A written text constitutes an expressive being, and what it expresses—its meaning—supervenes on the physical text. But it does not (apart from questionable cases of self-reference) express the written text it supervenes on. The expression and supervenience relations rarely, if ever, coincide.

As complex as the metaphysical issues are in Hegel’s account of hypnosis, clairvoyance, and the feeling soul, the epistemological issues are treated straightforwardly. Knowledge *strictu sensu* involves rule-governed construction of the fact or object known within the mind. But so-called immediate knowledge can access its internal world without recourse to the stepwise construction of consciousness. The soul can be the “soul of a world” without external limit because the constraints of space and time, which are exact, determinate, and give the rule to the understanding, are not operative here. This immediate access to the whole of the world is unreliable and not objective, and it is cognitive at all only when the content dredged up is subjected to categorial construction to some minimal degree. “Visionary knowledge,” as Hegel sometimes calls

it, is really a misnomer—it would be better described as a “visionary cognitive state” because it is not knowledge at all.

#### THE LIBERATION OF THE SOUL

The material and the spiritual are not divorced from one another—although they are certainly not strictly identical, they are unified. But the merely formal organization of spiritual material which constitutes the form of feeling must express itself in the body, for otherwise the bodily states of the individual would diverge increasingly from the self-determination of spirit. If spirit is not divorced from body, it must gain control of the body, make the body its means of expression. This organization of the body, if it is to embody the spiritual unity of the determinations of the soul, must be an organization of the body over and above that merely organic organization already present. This form of organization is habit. Notice that habit is purely formal; virtually any content can be embodied in habit. “The form of habit, like any other, is certainly open to complete contingency of content. . . . At the same time however, habit is what is most essential to the existence of all spirituality within the individual subject. It enables the subject to be a concrete immediacy, an ideality of soul, so that the religious or moral etc. content belongs to him as this self, this soul, and is in him neither merely implicitly as an endowment, nor as a transient-sensation or presentation, nor as an abstract inwardness cut off from action and actuality, but as a part of his being” (§410).

Hegel says several times that grasping the determination of habit is very difficult, and he seems to have considered the emphasis he places on habit and the role he gives it to be a fairly novel and important contribution to our knowledge of the mental. We can question the novelty of such an emphasis in the light of the importance of custom in Hume and his followers, but not its importance. The essential determination of habit, Hegel says, is that it is our liberation from sensation and feeling. It is this we must now seek to understand.

The life of feeling and sensation is that of a soul totally sunken in its sensations and feelings—it has no “distance” from them, but it is overwhelmed by them and indeed is at best a merely formal point of

unity within them. When the soul acquires habits, however, sensation and feeling lose their commanding grip on the soul; they no longer dominate it. "It is *free* of these determinations insofar as it is neither interested in nor occupied with them" (§410). This aspect of habit is called inurement when considered as a theoretical attitude; in its subjective practical aspect it is indifference to satisfaction, and as objectively practical the soul is liberated from the particularities of its existence by acquiring skill. "In habit the soul makes an abstract universal being of itself and reduces what is particular in feelings and consciousness to a mere determination of its being" (§410).

Up to this stage the soul has been a self only formally, which means not in complete actuality. At its simplest level, soul is a panoply of singular determinations; these are then connected with one another and even come to wear their connectedness on their sleeves, although only abstractly, in self-feeling. But when in habit the soul makes itself an abstract universal, it must free itself from the immersion into its particular feelings and sensations which characterizes even the level of self-feeling. It does so in taking the patterns of unification in feeling and making them *natural*, immediacies presupposed by and within which spirit realizes itself. Habit makes the feeling organization of the determinations of soul into a second nature. Thus this whole level of organization is now related to the further progress of spirit as sensation and feeling are to organic being. In habit the particular sensation or feeling is unimportant, as the particular pieces of matter are unimportant to the body. And the soul, in having habits, relates itself not to a singular determination of itself but to a universal and persistent determination of itself. Since the ego is the universal itself (according to Hegel), it relates itself to itself more adequately in habit.<sup>7</sup> "Nevertheless, the universal to which the soul relates itself in habit differs from the self-determining concrete universal present in pure thinking, in that it is only the abstract universality brought forth through reflection from the repetition of numerous singularities" (§410, *Zusatz*).

Because in habit its immediate determinatenesses are reduced to unimportance, the soul, as their abstract universality, is now left

7. Hegel's conception of the ego or self is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 6.

free of them. By no longer being exhausted in its particular states, by acquiring interesting higher-order and longer-term properties, the soul gains independence, a character of its own, an identity. Thus through habit soul also gains dominance over its corporeality and comes to control its body, which is now "something unre-sistingly pervaded by the soul, something subjected to the liberating power of the soul's ideality. It is therefore through this separation of the soul from its corporeity and the sublation of this separation, that this *inwardness* of soul and *externality* of corporeity emerge as a mediated unity" (§411, *Zusatz*). In this, the soul as actual, the body is the sign and the expression of the soul. In acquiring habits the soul has learned to withstand certain pains, to forgo or ignore certain pleasures, to go beyond the immediate material of sensation. By acquiring set patterns of simple behaviors, it is ready to make the leap into larger and larger compounded patterns that mark a significant increase in complexity and sophistication. The patterns of habitual action form the presupposition for the rule-governed forms of behavior of later stages. The behaviorists were not totally off the mark; they just mistook one of the lowest levels of mental organization for the totality of mind.

Actual soul is both the conclusion of the Anthropology and the germ of the Phenomenology, for the self now sets itself as an abstract universality over against its particular determinations, and "soul which posits its being over against itself, having sublated and determined it as its own, has lost the significance of being soul" (§412). This abstract universality is the I, the ego.