
Hegel's Reconception of the Philosophy of Mind

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HEGEL'S PREDECESSORS

Many histories of philosophy attempt to classify Hegel as a latter-day rationalist. While there is much to be said for such a classification, in the philosophy of mind¹ it can be misleading. For however much Hegel may share with his rationalist predecessors, his philosophy of mind is dominated by very different concerns.

The central questions in the rationalist philosophy of mind concern the substantiality, simplicity, immortality, immateriality, and freedom of the soul. The doctrines of concept acquisition, judgment, the nature of sensation and perception, and so forth are developed to support the metaphysical positions at the center of rationalist concern. Despite their interest in concept acquisition, the empiricists, in their reaction against rationalism, retain a strong, though critical, interest in the search for the attributes of the soul. Even in Kant we find that, alongside his revolutionary doctrines of concept acquisition, judgment, and the nature of sensation and perception, the attributes of the soul receive careful attention in the first *Critique*.² But virtually all of these questions simply disappear

1. I am using "philosophy of mind" in its contemporary sense, where "mind" is not a translation of the Hegelian term *Geist*. In extension, the contemporary "philosophy of mind" is closer to Hegel's "subjective spirit."

2. Karl Ameriks, in *Kant's Theory of Mind*, has recently argued that Kant is not simply critical of rational psychology but also holds positive doctrines about the attributes of the soul.

when we turn to Hegel. He gives the term "soul" a quite restricted meaning and place in his system and claims that his predecessors asked the wrong questions about the soul. McTaggart remarks, for instance, that Hegel just does not seem interested in the immortality of the soul.³ In *Encyclopedia* §389 Hegel claims immateriality for the soul but then turns right around and says that this is of no real interest unless one makes some faulty presuppositions (we analyze this passage more closely below). The attributes of the soul posed a central philosophical tangle for his predecessors; in Hegel's philosophy this tangle has dissolved, leaving but few residual questions scattered around the system.

Against Rational Psychology

In his introduction to the *Philosophy of Spirit*, Hegel makes it quite clear that he thinks that both the rationalists and empiricists had the wrong approach to philosophical thinking about spirit and the mental (§378). He gives Kant credit for having freed all subsequent philosophers from the need to do rational psychology (§47). But on a closer look at §47, it is not clear why Hegel lauds Kant for freeing us from rational psychology, for he claims both that Kant's criticisms are not essentially different from the criticisms of the empiricists, in particular Hume's, and that they are faulty. Why, then, should the destruction of rational psychology be credited to Kant? Perhaps the answer is simply that the power of the Kantian system and its greater acceptance (at least in Germany) made rational psychology impossible in a way that Hume's philosophy did not. The destruction of rational psychology would then be attributed to Kant as a matter of historical fact.

In any case, Hegel disagrees with Kant's (and therefore Hume's) reasons for rejecting rational psychology. In both cases, according to Hegel, their objection amounts to pointing out that the properties that rational psychology seeks to attribute to the soul are not sensible, cannot be found in sense experience. For both Hume and Kant this entails that we do not have and cannot employ any meaningful concept of them. But this objection does not bother Hegel in the least; he replies that the whole point of thinking, of theorizing, is

3. J. M. E. McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 5.

the construction or development of concepts that go beyond what can be found in sense experience, so that the use of such concepts cannot be what is wrong with rational psychology.⁴

When he intimates what is wrong with rational psychology, Hegel criticizes the rationalists for having treated the soul as a *thing*; for having used abstract categories of the understanding which are, properly speaking, too lowly to grasp the nature of spirit; and, last but not least, for having misconceived the very nature of philosophical truth and the nature of predication. These charges are all connected, each cutting a little deeper than the preceding one.

In accusing rationalists of treating the soul as a thing, Hegel argues that they use "merely abstract categories of the understanding":

The old metaphysics considers the soul as a thing. "Thing" is, however, a very ambiguous expression. As a thing we primarily understand something immediately existing, something we represent sensibly, and this is the sense in which the soul has to be spoken of. It has accordingly been asked where the soul has its seat. As possessing a seat the soul is in space and is represented sensibly. Similarly it is appropriate to the conception of the soul as a thing to ask whether it is simple or composite. The question is particularly interesting in relation to the soul's immortality, insofar as this is thought to be conditioned by the soul's simplicity. But in fact abstract simplicity is a determination which corresponds to the essence of the soul as little as composition does. (§34, *Zusatz*, my tr.)

It is clear in this passage that Hegel is charging the rationalists with something like a category mistake. Their notion of the soul mislocates the heart of the matter, and when one sees this, many of the earlier troublesome questions about the soul's attributes simply fall away. Yet Hegel's critique is more radical than the mere accusation of a category mistake about the soul, for he believes that a similar confusion occurs in other central concepts:

4. Hegel does not think that concepts can be simply divided into the sensible and the nonsensible. While some concepts—e.g., red or sweet—are clearly sensible, there is a wide range of progressively less sensible concepts, from such as fragility through such as electromagnetic radiation to even the concept of spirit itself. Concepts vary in their degree of empirical sensitivity.

The question of the immateriality of the soul can still be of interest only if a distinction is drawn in which matter is presented as *true* and spirit as a *thing*. Even in the hand of the physicists, however, matter has become subtler in more recent times, for they have hit upon *imponderable* materials such as heat, light, etc., to which they have found no difficulty in adding space and time. Although these imponderables have lost not only gravity, the property peculiar to matter, but also to a certain extent the capacity of offering resistance, they still have a sensuous determinate being, a self-externality. *Vital matter* however, which can also be found included among them, lacks not only gravity but every other determinate being which might justify its being regarded as *material*. (§389)

Here Hegel dismisses the question of the immateriality of the soul, not as senseless, but as simply uninteresting. What interest it may have is founded on a set of confusions. Noteworthy in this passage is that Hegel does not attack the confusion of treating the soul as a thing but rather points to the difficulties and confusion surrounding the concept of matter. The scientists of his day were busy extending Newtonian physics, or trying to, by discovering new forms of "matter" which were successively more divorced from their original model. The notion of "vital matter" takes this development to a ridiculous extreme, for it would share none of the essential properties of matter. The soul is clearly not a Newtonian particle, but if we let the notion of matter wander too far from this paradigm, Hegel believes, the question of the immateriality of the soul becomes empty and loses interest. Those who ask about the immateriality of the soul, then, are subject to a double confusion. They commit a category mistake in treating the soul as a thing and exhibit as well a lack of real understanding of the notion of matter. They are, as it were, in the wrong categorial ballpark.

A standing fault of rationalistic dogmatism, according to Hegel, is the tendency to elevate commonsense, everyday concepts abstracted from sense experience into universal and necessary metaphysical principles or categories. But the kind of concepts we use in our everyday encounters with the finite world are quite insufficient to express the universal and necessary truths that are the content of metaphysics:

The thinking of the old metaphysics was finite thinking, for it moved along thought determinations, the limits of which were supposed to be fixed and not further negatable. It was asked, for example, does God exist? [*Hat Gott Dasein?*] And existence is considered something purely positive, something final and excellent. We will see later that existence is in no way a pure positive, but is rather a determination which is too base for the Idea and not worthy of God. . . . In the same way one asked whether the soul is simple or composite. Thus simplicity as well counted as a final determination, capable of grasping the True. *Simple* is, however, as poor, abstract and one-sided a determination as existence, a determination which we will later see is, as untrue, incapable of grasping the True. If the soul is treated as only simple, it is determined by such an abstraction as one-sided and finite. (§28, *Zusatz*, my tr.)

Rational psychology tries to capture the soul in simple and abstract concepts that cannot do justice to the actuality of the soul, and it proceeds by trying to assign these predicates in a thoroughly external fashion.⁵

Against Empiricist Psychology

Hegel is quite aware that there is a perfectly legitimate enterprise called empirical psychology. This is as much a science as physics or chemistry, although its practitioners, according to Hegel, tend not to be very clearheaded about their enterprise. Insofar as it is purely empirical, it is limited to gathering and classifying the empirical phenomena of mind. But many psychologists also attempt to philosophize about the mind on this empirical basis, or worse, to claim that empirical psychology is already philosophy—an idea Hegel completely rejects. While philosophy can never let the empirical realm out of its sight, empiricism is a deadly antiphilosophical disease.

According to Hegel, empiricism is methodologically no better off than rationalism, and perhaps worse. In both cases abstract con-

5. A discussion of Hegel's theory of predication, however central to his metaphysics, would take us too far afield. A good introduction to this topic is provided by Richard Aquila, "Predication and Hegel's Metaphysics," in *Hegel*, ed. M. J. Inwood, pp. 67–84.

cepts are assigned externally to the subject; both have faulty views of predication. But since empiricism restricts its view to the sensible, it is blinded entirely to the metaphysical and incapable of dealing at all with the universal and necessary: "An empiricism that is consistently carried out, insofar as it restricts its content to the finite, rejects the supersensible in general, or at least the knowledge and determination of it, and leaves to thought only abstraction and formal universality and identity" (§38, my tr.). Hegel clearly has an extreme "ideal type" of empiricism in mind here, one that allows only the collection and classification of empirical data without permitting the essential theoretical move to nonsensible predicates or modal qualifiers; as such, it makes science and philosophy impossible: "The fundamental deception in scientific empiricism is that it uses the metaphysical categories of matter, force, and certainly also of one, many, universality and infinitude, etc.; infers in accordance with such categories, and thereby presupposes and applies the forms of inference, all the while not knowing that it thus contains and practices metaphysics itself; and uses these categories and their connections in a completely uncritical and unconscious way" (§38, my tr.).

Hegel also has a particular objection to the empiricist's practice of "philosophical" psychology: "In empirical psychology, it is the particularizations into which spirit is divided which are regarded as being rigidly distinct, so that spirit is treated as a mere aggregate of independent powers, each of which stands only in reciprocal and therefore external relation to the other" (§378, *Zusatz*). The empiricist collects various phenomena and tries to sort them under different classifications. The different kinds of mental phenomena are then attributed to various different mental faculties. But, Hegel complains, there is no principle behind this division of faculties; they are thought up ad hoc, and there is no way to show their intrinsic unity. Only someone with an independent (philosophical) conception of the whole can be proof against this danger. This conception of the whole must be validated independently of the particular empirical phenomena and must be capable of (at least partially) justifying the classifications employed by the working empirical psychologist. But the empiricist, who has no such conception, cannot but remain captured in empirical detail, unable to find

the key to the underlying unity in the phenomena precisely because it is underlying and supersensible. The empiricist is like a builder with all the raw materials but no plans or idea of what is to be built.

The problem for both rationalism and empiricism, then, is that they treat the soul as a supersensible thing. Thinking of the soul as a *thing*, rationalism tries to conceive of it using only the concepts that are appropriate to finite objects and thus necessarily falls short of its goal. Empiricism, on the other hand, noting that the soul is *supersensible*, refuses to try to say anything interesting about it and restricts itself to botanizing the empirical phenomena of mind uncritically. Empiricism is correct in holding that one cannot use concepts compounded from sense experience to describe or conceive the supersensible; it is wrong in thinking that therefore the supersensible cannot be conceived. Rationalism is correct in trying to conceive the supersensible; it is mistaken in attempting to do so by simply assigning it predicates constructed from sense experience uncritically.

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HEGEL'S METHODOLOGY

Having seen what Hegel thinks is wrong with the philosophical psychology of his predecessors, we now face the more difficult task of figuring out what he believes to be the right way to do philosophy of mind. When Hegel attempts to state the proper method in philosophy, he often describes it as being basically passive. One needs merely to watch the appropriate concept (in our case the concept of spirit) develop or unfold itself. Even more frequently Hegel drops all reference to the philosopher and claims that philosophy deals only with the self-development of the concept. Today we find such a description of philosophical method quite unilluminating, and to understand what Hegel means by such talk one has to work out in some detail his theory of the nature of thought. By the end of this book, Hegel's descriptions of a passive philosophical method will make sense, but for now let us approach the task from another angle. Let us try to reconstruct Hegel's intentions in his philosophy of mind without relying explicitly on his own methodological pronouncements. How does the content and practice of

his philosophical psychology distinguish his enterprise from the unsuccessful attempts of his predecessors?

From Soul to Spirit

The first difference between Hegel and his predecessors, one notices immediately, is a shift from a focus on the soul to a focus on spirit. The word "soul" is reserved by Hegel for the lowest level of spirit: "Spirit is distinguished from the soul, which is both the middle between corporeality and spirit and the tie between them. Spirit as soul is sunken into corporeality and the soul is what animates [*das Belebende*] the body" (§34, *Zusatz*, my tr.). Thus "soul" acquires a restricted meaning, namely, spirit at its most thinglike level—a meaning Hegel probably adopts because of his predecessors' predilection for treating soul as a thing. Its successor concept, spirit, is not thinglike at all: rather, spirit is thought to be a pure, self-generating activity.⁶ Rather than being thought of as a particular kind of thing with specific properties and interactions with other things, spirit has to be thought of as a particular pattern of activity, a special kind of organization which interactions among things can exhibit. Spirit cannot be adequately grasped through categories or concepts abstracted from finite things, much less from sensible things, because it is not a thing or even like a thing.

And "spirit" has a much broader use than "soul," for it denotes the underlying activity informing and accounting for not only the mental activity of the individual but also the social and historical activity of a community. Hegel's shift from "soul" to "spirit" emphasizes the nonthingishness, the active nature of the human essence as well as its communal or social nature. Hegel thereby emphasizes that he is investigating what is universal to us all, one and the same in us all, something in which we each participate rather than an entity we each individually possess (or are) independently of all others.

As comprehension of the nature of spirit, which informs not only the intellectual and practical life of the individual but of the whole of

6 For a good introduction to the concept of spirit, see R. C. Solomon, "Hegel's Concept of *Geist*," in *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. A. MacIntyre, pp. 125–49. The concept of spirit is treated again in more detail in Chapter 3.

humanity as well, the philosophy of spirit must be seen as a much broader discipline than the philosophy of soul. Describing something as a spiritual phenomenon presupposes for its individuation as well as its explanation a certain set of explanatory principles not applicable to the merely mechanical, chemical, or organic but pervasive throughout the psychological, anthropological, and sociological.

Hegel characterizes the spiritual as the internal, in contrast to the externality of material objects (see, for example, §381). This contrast between internal and external is best understood, I believe, in terms of self- and other-determination. Spirit is what is self-determined; that is, spiritual phenomena are to be construed as manifestations of a self-productive activity. A self-productive activity is a special form of teleological activity, namely, one in which the telos is itself such self-productive activity.⁷ To describe something as spiritual, then, is to commit oneself to the notion that it can be adequately explained only by showing how it is the manifestation of such a self-producing activity.

This explanatory schema has a broad-ranging field of application. Mechanical interactions, such as those studied by Newton, are not themselves to be explained in terms of manifesting a self-producing activity, but the very existence of mechanical interactions in the world is to be explained in those terms, for their existence is itself a spiritual phenomenon. Virtually all forms of human activity—whether individual or social—are to be understood as manifestations of a self-productive activity. The philosophy of spirit is devoted to showing how human activity embodies the defining structure of spirit.

Subjective Spirit

With this introductory understanding of Hegel's general conception of the philosophy of spirit⁸, we can also see what a philosophy of subjective spirit—what we today call the philosophy of mind—

7. See Crawford Elder, *Appropriating Hegel*, for more discussion of this form of teleology.

8. I return to a fuller description of spirit in Chapter 3.

should be. A philosophy of subjective spirit is devoted to showing how the psychology of individual humans embodies the defining structure of spirit. Particular explanations of particular human actions are not, of course, in the purview of the philosopher, but discovering and explicating the form such explanations must take, as well as relating these forms to their counterparts in other disciplines, including logic and philosophy, are. The philosopher has a dual relation to empirical psychology; the philosophical understanding of the specifications of the general concept of spirit must be tested against the empirical facts, and the results and methods of empirical psychologists must be tested against the a priori analysis of the concept of the spiritual.

We must think of Hegel as directing his efforts inter alia toward the constitution of a more adequate empirical psychology. That this is indeed the case has recently been heavily emphasized by M. J. Petry's work in translating and editing the *Philosophy of Nature* and the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. Hegel shows throughout his work a good knowledge of the contemporary state of the sciences, and it is constantly his concern to show how the empirical disciplines and his own system coalesce. Perhaps the most convincing evidence that his psychology was practiced with one eye on the state of the empirical disciplines is that in his manuscript of 1822 the second main factor said to contribute to the demise of the older philosophies of mind is itself an empirical one, namely, the discovery of hypnotism (called in Hegel's time animal magnetism) (*PSS*, vol. 1, p. 99). Here, Hegel thinks, is an empirical phenomenon that resists explanation by any of the old methods; it confounds the categories of the understanding.

Hypnotism prompted an understandable fascination in Hegel's time. Besides being good for parlor games, it was also seen to provide a serious challenge to the psychological theories of the day. Familiarity has perhaps bred contempt in contemporary psychological theorizing for the still amazing features of hypnotism. We have today a fairly divided stance toward it: we regularly turn to it to help in police work, psychotherapy, and self-development programs, but we also regard its results skeptically, since no theory has yet explained or accommodated it. Hypnotism attracted considerable attention in early nineteenth-century Berlin, including special stud-

ies by committees of the Berlin Akademie.⁹ Hegel's interest in the phenomenon mirrors the importance it played in all psychological speculation of the era.

Hegel does not cite the phenomenon of hypnotism as itself revealing a higher point of view; that is, he certainly does not believe that the hypnotic subject or the hypnotist has special access to an epistemologically privileged position—quite the contrary. Nor does he claim that hypnotism is incomprehensible, miraculous, or mystical and therefore overcomes the philosophies of mind of the rationalists and empiricists. Rather, he claims that hypnotism presents us with a phenomenon that cannot be explained using the abstract thing-based concepts common to rationalist and empiricist philosophies of mind. If we go beyond these concepts, however, we can understand hypnotic phenomena, and Hegel takes it as one of the strong points of his philosophy of subjective spirit that it can accommodate hypnotic phenomena, whereas its competitors cannot. Here, then, is a clear case in which Hegel calls on empirical phenomena to support his philosophical doctrine, and in which he shows a clear expectation that philosophical doctrine will make contact with the empirical sphere.

Philosophy and Psychology

We can refine our idea of what Hegel thinks the relation between philosophy and the empirical sciences ought to be from a remark in his text of 1822 about Eschenmayer's psychology:¹⁰

The first part, psychology, as empirical, makes no claim to being scientific; the second part, pure psychology, ought to have the determination of exposing the principles of this empirical material and of discovering the structure of the schema simply presupposed thereby and indicating its derivation. Eschenmayer, however, without further

9. For an account of the controversies surrounding hypnotism in nineteenth-century Berlin, see Walter Artelt, *Der Mesmerismus in Berlin*.

10. A. C. A. Eschenmayer (1768–1852) was a practicing physician who in 1811 became professor *extraordinarius* of medicine and philosophy at Tübingen (Hegel's alma mater), where later (1818) he also held the chair of practical philosophy. He was influenced by Schelling in his early career and thus shared common roots with Hegel. His fascination with hypnotism was often satirized, but his psychology textbook is not particularly distinguished.

ado simply puts the speculative knowledge that should come in here into (1) reflections by means of concepts, judgments, and inferences, and (2) ideal intuitions, (*PSS*, vol. 1, p. 101, my tr.).

Hegel subsequently castigates Eschenmayer for the all-too-common fault of discussing the material in an empirical and, in the end, arbitrary fashion. And Hegel dismisses any possible call on ideal intuition out of hand; intuition is a fickle lady on whom anyone can call.

What emerges from this passage is a characterization of what a pure psychology is supposed to accomplish and a warning about how not to do it. A pure psychology is dedicated to "exposing the principles of this empirical material and of discovering the structure of the schema simply presupposed thereby and indicating its derivation" (*PSS*, vol. 1, p. 101). This endeavor breaks down into a two-part task. The first part of the task, enunciating the principles of the empirical material, is only vaguely stated. Could Hegel mean here that the pure psychologist is responsible for all the work of the theoretician, namely, stating laws and making empirical generalizations to be tested against empirical data? In this case the "pure" psychologist would hardly differ from the normal empirical psychologist, for we could hardly expect the empirical psychologist to be content with merely gathering data without reworking it into a theory.¹¹ By the "principles" of the empirical material, however, Hegel does not mean the empirical generalizations covering that material; rather, he has in mind the principles governing the organization and form of such first-level generalizations. The pure psychologist is a metatheorist clarifying the principles (and the concepts, we might add) that govern the construction of particular descriptions and explanations in empirical psychology. Hegel engages in such reflections in his own philosophy of subjective spirit when he attempts to clarify the concepts of imagination, feeling, sensation, or thought and when he attacks associationist psychology in general as being built on faulty assumptions.

The second part of the pure psychologist's task is to discover the construction and the derivation of the schema thereby presup-

11. In Hegel's terminology the empirical investigator, qua empirical, is confined to gathering data—but such an investigator is not a scientist. Theorization is essential to science.

posed. Again Hegel's description is far from clear, particularly because it is not clear whether it is the empirical material that presupposes the schema to be discovered or the enunciation of the principles of the material which presupposes the sought-for schema. I think it is the latter that Hegel intends, that is, that the second part of the pure psychologist's task is to put the set of principles he promulgates in the first part of his task into a broader context and onto a firm philosophical foundation. Thus Hegel says, a bit later in the 1822 manuscript, "In each particular philosophical science, what is logical is presupposed as the purely universal science, and so as the scientific factor in all science" (*PSS*, vol. 1, p. 103). The pure psychologist who discovers a set of principles that will handily deal with all the empirical material at hand is not yet finished, for an explanation of why the principles take the form they do and how they fulfill the conditions of science in general must also be given. The philosophical psychologist must therefore operate on three levels, developing both the empirical theory and the metatheory of empirical psychology and putting them into a broader context. These tasks cannot be performed serially, either; the pure psychologist cannot await the completion of either the empirical theory of psychology or its metatheory before beginning to develop the broader viewpoint. These distinguishable tasks must in fact be in constant reciprocal contact, for the goal is the development of a maximally coherent worldview.

We must ask, however, what would count as indicating the derivation of the model with which one explains empirical material. This task belongs to the third level of reflection isolated above. There seem to be two alternatives: either the model is itself derived from the empirical materials it is eventually used to explain, or it is derived from a priori principles. Hegel insists that "all cognition derives subjectively from perception and observations, and the cognition of appearances is not only of the utmost importance, but is completely indispensable" (*PSS*, vol. 1, p. 97); thus he recognizes the causal role perception plays in knowledge. Yet philosophy—that is, the justification of philosophical truth—is also supposed to be pure and (at least relatively) independent of experience. The three different levels of psychological investigation cannot be independently practiced, for bottom-level observations play a necessary causal role in spurring our *thinking*, whereas our observational and

experimental techniques, as well as the categorial structures employed, all have aspects that are extremely empirically insensitive, aspects deeply enough ingrained into our practices to be resistant, though not necessarily impervious, to empirical counterexample.

Such solutions are never really neat, and this one leaves us with a residual problem. The highest level of philosophical reflection is apparently a priori, according to Hegel. The practice of empirical psychology, though, is clearly empirical. How, then, do these entirely different enterprises mesh? All theorizing, and therefore all science, involves the application of concepts that are empirically insensitive, concepts that are, for all intents and purposes, a priori (this much Hegel shares with Kant). The theorizer employs no concepts that do not have an a priori basis, for even those concepts that seem paradigmatically abstracted from sense experience alone contain or implicate a categorial structure that could only have an a priori justification.¹² This is why Hegel accuses the empiricist of operating with metaphysical concepts without appreciating that fact. There can be no clear boundaries drawn between the philosophical and the empirical, for all attempts to describe or theorize about even the simplest empirical phenomena involve philosophical commitments. The conscientious theoretician must therefore also be a philosopher.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT

Let me attempt to summarize Hegel's understanding of the philosophy of mind. As he himself explicitly acknowledges, "the Philosophy of Spirit can be neither empirical nor metaphysical" (*PSS*, vol. 1, p. 103); that is, the philosophy of spirit is not an empirical effort to systematize a certain set of phenomena, nor is it concerned to elaborate an abstract concept of soul which has no contact at all with empirical reality. The philosophy of spirit attempts to uncover the universal and necessary structure inherent in the empirical phenomena of spirit. Because it is concerned with the embodiment of this structure in empirical, individual facts, it must answer to

12. The simplest and most straightforward example is Hegel's insistence that the use of the copula, even predication itself, involves metaphysical concepts (see §38).

them by being able to cast light on their nature. But the structures it claims to find embodied in the world must themselves ultimately prove themselves universal and necessary. It is to this degree a pure, a priori science. Whether we accept Hegel's attempt to balance the empirical and the a priori, we can recognize several significant advances in his treatment of the philosophy of mind.

First, he wrenches the attention of philosophers away from the fruitless, age-old questions of rational psychology. He does not try to refute the rationalists' answers; if he says anything one way or the other, he most likely agrees with the rationalists. But he breaks the fascination of these questions all the more radically by simply ignoring them and spending his time and energy in more fruitful pursuits. After Descartes, the apparently central problem of the philosophy of mind was the nature of mental substance and how it differs from and is related to material substance. Hume and Kant realized that there are other, more important questions about mind to be answered, but only with Hegel is there recognition of the fact that Descartes's whole line of thought is founded on a mistake.

Second, because he does not worry about the attributes of the soul, Hegel focuses more on explicating the structure of spirit, that is, the structure of the explanatory principles to which the use of the concept commits us. We shall see that Hegel has a keen sense of the nature and complexity of the concepts necessary to do justice to human activity.

Finally, in his attempt to accommodate the wealth of empirical phenomena as well as the transcendental aspects of our knowledge, Hegel develops a nonreductive approach to mind, which we explore in more detail in Chapter 3. Such an approach is finding increasing sympathy among contemporary philosophers. It offers us a more sophisticated understanding of the relations between the various sciences and promises deeper insight in particular within the sciences of man. Contemporary philosophy of mind can now reclaim Hegel as an ancestor.