Project start:  September 25, 2004

The Afghan Victim Memorial Project:

An Online Memorial to the civilians killed by the U.S. Bombing, Invasion and Occupation of Afghanistan after September 11th

List of Individual Victims – The Obama presidency since January 21, 2009

Documentation of Innocent Afghans Killed by Commander-in-Chief Obama’s Military since January 21, 2009 

“Change You (and Afghans) Can Believe In”?

Afghans protest against a raid by U.S.-led coalition forces ...


ReutersSat Jan 24, 7:35 AM ET

Afghans protest against a raid by U.S.-led coalition forces in the Mehtar Lam district of Laghman province which they said killed civilians January 24, 2009. U.S.-led coalition forces killed 15 militants, including a woman, during an operation targeting a Taliban commander in the eastern Afghan province of Laghman overnight, the U.S. military said Saturday. A provincial Afghan official and a village elder told Reuters up to 22 civilians had been killed during the raid, an assertion denied by the U.S. military, which said it had no reports of civilian deaths "at this point. REUTERS/Rafiq Shirzad (AFGHANISTAN)

To use the language of the U.S. military propaganda establishment, “yet again, this shows the [insurgents'] U.S’ complete disregard for innocent Afghan civilians."

The following data base picks up where the prior ones covering the Bush years left off.  Supporting documentation (usually involving multiple sources) exists for each of the incidents reported herein.  The aim is to provide as accurate as possible accounts of U.S. and/or NATO attacks which caused the deaths of innocent Afghans and/or tribespersons living in the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands. U.S, NATO, official Afghan, and most of the western media go to great lengths to censor either by commission (lying) or omission (silence) reports of such attacks. We can expect redoubled efforts at such censorship and disinformation under the Obama regime with powerful assists provided by the humanitarian imperialists (such as Soros-funded Human Rights Watch, National Public Radio, Harvard’s Carr Center, and the like).

Obama simply redefines the old Bush policies and tactics in Afghanistan which largely remain in place, in Operation Redefinition:

March 31, 2009. To see click on 

Further details in Peter Baker, “The Words Have Changed, but Have the Policies,” New York Times (April 2, 2009) at

Herschel Smith in his “Captain’s Journal” on April 13, 2009, a very pro-military website, wrote about the U.S. Marine assault on April 1, 2009 upon Now Zad in Helmand province. After describing the U.S. Marines’ move into Now Zad, Smith posted a photo with the following commentary,

“That was the answer we were looking for…

God Bless the U.S. Marines in Now Zad, Afghanistan”


All that was missing was a prancing Dallas Cowboy cheerleader - MWH.




From older men to younger girls, the U.S and NATO forces spare no one in their “democracy of death” excused by apologies for “collateral damage.”

A middle school principal, Qabol Khan, was killed while driving a car by U.S. forces in Khost on February 6/7, 2009. The young girl was killed by U.S forces on September 9, 2008, in the massacre at Azizbad.

In a rare example of independent photo journalism, Lynsey Addario (New York Times, February 19, 2009)) published photos of some wounded victims of U.S/NATO actions in Afghanistan. The first photo shows Gul Juma, 9, who lost her arm in a NATO attack in Sangin village in December 2008. The second photo shows legless Rabia, 70, living in a Kabul refugee camp whose husband and son were killed by NATO forces. The third photo shows Syed Mohammad, 67, in his home in the Hotkeil neighborhood of eastern Kabul. U.S. Special Forces and their Afghan satraps burst into his home and executed four members of his family.


An unarmed Afghan man executed

on March 5, 2008

outside Hyderabad, Kandahar Province. An unarmed Afghan man was stopped at a checkpoint by Sgt. Joseph D. Newell, 39, of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd US Special Forces Group from Ft. Bragg (N.C.). The Afghan man was shot by Newell who then cut off the dead man’s ear. Newell was charged with premeditated murder and mutilating a dead body. An Afghan who served as a translator to Newell's Special Forces team testified that the victim had his hands in his pockets while being questioned and subsequently shot by Newell, and that the victim's hands remained in his pockets after the killing. According to defense lawyers, Newell believed the unidentified Afghan to be a Taliban insurgent who posed a threat to him. On February 25, 2009, a U.S. military jury acquitted Newell. Justice in America?

Killed by a US Special Forces Master Sergeant with U.S. 3rd Special Forces Group


U.S. Special Forces in Afghanistan Kill with Utter Impunity.

In memory of


Abdul Habib

Mohammed Ali, brother of Abdul

between 1-2 AM, January 16, 2008


in a two-family house in Kandahar city. Neil Durkin of Amnesty International (certainly not Human Rights Watch) wrote in the British daily, The Telegraph, about this incident in its issue of February 27, 2009, that is more than 13 months after the murderous attack by U.S. Special Forces based at Firebase Gecko:

Between 1-2am on the rainy night of 16 January 2008, a large number of international military personnel wearing desert camouflage surrounded the house of two brothers living in a two-family house in Kandahar. According to various family members, the soldiers knocked loudly on the door. One of the brothers, Abdul Habib, went to answer it and was shot. Numerous soldiers ("the Americans", say the family) dragged Abdul out into the courtyard and shot him at least five more times. Then, inside the house, the soldiers saw the other brother - Mohammed Ali - running up the stairs from his basement dwelling and he too was hit by at least seven rounds and killed instantly. Members of the household say that soldiers then searched everywhere ("they even opened a package of biscuits"), found nothing (no weapons, nothing else) and left.

This is the family's account, in some respects backed up by neighbours. Is it accurate? You could try asking the US command at the local base - "Firebase Gecko". Except they don't want to talk about it. NATO has denied any involvement, while local Afghan police are apparently staying out of it (local residents say that the police who operate a permanent checkpoint near the brothers' home were specifically told by the soldiers shortly before the incident not to respond if they heard gunfire).

The UN expert Philip Alston has tried to investigate the case, noting that the victims "are widely acknowledged, even by well-informed government officials, to have had no connection to the Taliban". He's got nothing out of the US commander about what happened. In fact Firebase Gecko is widely perceived as untouchable, not least because US Special Forces ("other government agencies" like the CIA) operate from there.


Executed in middle of the night by U.S. Special Forces


Featured article:

What Napoleon Can Teach Obama About Guerrilla Warfare

The Huffington Post
By Sheldon Filger 

For nearly eight years, the United States has been engaged in a low-intensity conflict of high stakes in Afghanistan. Prior to 9/11, this impoverished, mountainous nation was regarded by Washington as an anachronistic backwater, ceasing to be a strategically important entity since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union's army of occupation, followed soon after by the demise of that former superpower. It was only with the realization that the Taliban regime in Kabul had furnished a non-state actor, Al-Qaeda, with an operational base for planning the onslaught that killed thousands of Americans in New York City, Washington, DC and Pennsylvania that U.S. geopolitical calculations involving South Asia were transformed.

Ironically, even after 9/11, the Bush administration still considered Afghanistan somewhat of a backwater theatre of operations, choosing to mount its major military effort in Iraq, a country that did not attack America. For most of the last eight years, the battle against a resurgent Taliban has been fought by a small contingent of U.S. troops, reinforced by a dozen or more NATO allies involving a multitude of microscopic deployments, each with its own unique rules of engagement. The opposition to the Islamist forces in Afghanistan can best be described as a multi-headed hydra mounted on a small body. Military specialists, especially those with expertise on counterinsurgency and partisan warfare, would not be surprised at the current negative character of the war in Afghanistan, which has spilled over into Pakistan, in the process destabilizing that nuclear-armed state.

President Barack Obama has long been opposed to the military adventure in Iraq, on the grounds that it had dangerously distracted the United States from focusing on crushing Al-Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan. History has already validated Obama's assessment on what the correct priority should have been for the U.S. armed forces. The question now facing Obama and his administration is what strategy to pursue in Afghanistan. The fragments that have emerged so far seem to indicate two trends: modestly reinforce the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, while linking the Taliban and Al-Qaeda presence in neighboring Pakistan to the overall theater of operations.

Will President Obama's approach on Afghanistan prove more efficacious than that of George W. Bush? The lessons of history raise doubts that deserve serious reflection. The United States has not had a stellar record in winning wars against determined insurgents fighting a fierce guerrilla war. Vietnam is a conspicuous reminder that even hundreds of thousands of American troops, backed by massive technical means and a powerful airforce, cannot guarantee victory.

There is a voice from the distant past who has something to say that is highly relevant to the military challenges facing the U.S. military in Afghanistan. The Swiss military theoretician, Antoine Henri Jomini, served as a senior staff officer in Napoleon's army during the Peninsular War. This brutal conflict, fought on the Iberian Peninsula, began with the occupation of Spain by the French army. The population revolted, leading to a savage conflict that gave rise to the term "guerrilla war." The British sent a small but well disciplined professional army to aid the Spanish insurgents, under the command of the Duke of Wellington. In five years the combined army of Spanish guerrillas and British regular troops utterly defeated the French. Napoleon's defeat in the Peninsular War, combined with his forced retreat from Russia, brought about his ultimate downfall.

When writing his seminal work, Art of War, Jomini applied the lessons he had learned during the Peninsular War to form general principals and doctrine on guerrilla and insurgent conflicts. The principals he laid down align with the American experience in Afghanistan with chilling relevance.

"When the people are supported by a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops, the difficulties are particularly great," wrote Jomini. "The invader has only an army, whereas his adversaries have both an army and a people in arms, making means of resistance out of everything and with each individual conspiring against the common enemy."

With centuries of virtually uninterrupted warfare, including a brutal Soviet occupation that the Afghans successfully resisted, a large component of the country's male population is well trained in small arms tactics, making expert use of their land's barren and mountainous terrain. Just as Wellington's troops added stiffening to the ranks of the Spanish guerrilla fighters, there exists a large corps of veteran fighters, including commanders, that multiplies the effectiveness of the younger insurgents joining the ranks of the Taliban in sufficient numbers to extend the conflict indefinitely.

Jomini provides a description of what he learned about insurgencies in the Peninsular War, lessons that are applicable two centuries later in the mountains of Afghanistan:

These obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is difficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and their connections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him. The commanders also know the country and, learning immediately the slightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best measures to defeat his projects. The enemy, without information of their movements and not in a condition to reconnoiter, having no resource but in his bayonets and certain of safety only in the concentration of his columns, is like a blind man. His combinations are failures. When, after the most carefully concerted movements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches he thinks he is about to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs of the enemy but his campfires. So while, like Don Quixote, he is attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communications, destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys and his depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must inevitably yield after a time.

Unless President Barack Obama restores the military draft, raises an army of several hundred thousand soldiers to occupy and guard every vital installation in Afghanistan, and convinces the American people that they must sustain such a massive occupation for possibly decades, and accept substantial casualties and massively increased military expenditures, he will lack the means to challenge the insurgency in a decisive manner. As commander in chief, therefore, Obama is faced with two choices. He either maintains the status quo with slightly more troops, which will mean only prolonged stalemate. Or he can refocus U.S. objectives on the limited goal of ensuring Afghanistan never again allows its territory to be used as a base to attack the United States.

The first choice only promises a higher list of dead and maimed Americans, and frightful expenditures at a time of profound economic and financial crisis. The latter choice opens up the possibility of a negotiated resolution of the conflict, leading to the attainment of U.S. national security objectives without the permanent occupation of a land historically hostile to all foreign armies.