"Only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning" (Wittgenstein, 1981, no.173).

"Actually I should like to say that... the words you utter or what you think as you utter them are not what matters, so much as the difference they make at various points in your life... Practice gives words their significance" (Wittgenstein, 1980a, p.85).

"Both ontogenetically and in the history of culture, our first expressions are in public space, and are vehicles of a quite unreflective awareness. Later we both develop more refined media, in concepts and images, and become more capable of carrying out some part of our expressive activity monologically; that is, we become capable of formulating some things just for ourselves, and hence of thinking privately" (Taylor, 1985, pp.91-92).

"... the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, of a form of life" (Wittgenstein 1953, no.23).

"We are concentrating... on the occasions on which [words] are said - on the enormously complicated situation in which [an expression] has a place, in which the expression itself has an almost negligible place" (Wittgenstein, 1966, p.2).

"What we find out in philosophy is trivial; it does not teach us new facts, only science does that. But the proper synopsis of these trivialities is enormously difficult, and has immense importance. Philosophy is in fact the synopsis of trivialities" (Wittgenstein, 1980b, p.26).

"An utterance is never just a reflection or an expression of something already existing outside it that is given and final. It always creates something that never existed before, something absolutely new and unrepeatable, and, moreover, it always has some relation to value (the true, the good, the beautiful, and so forth). But something created is always created out of something given (language, an observed phenomenon of reality, an experienced feeling, the speaking subject himself, something finalized in his world view, and so forth). What is given is completely transformed in what is created" (Bakhtin, 1986, pp.119-120).

What I want to talk of today - that is, mostly to talk 'of' rather than 'about' (and I will make this distinction clear in a moment) - is how, in our dialogical or conversational involvements both with each other and with our surrounding circumstances, we can create between us, a whole shared 'terrain', 'landscape', or 'inner world' of practical understandings that will enable us, in practice, knowing how we are 'placed' in such a world in relation to everything around us, to interact with each other and with our circumstances in a flowing, unconfused, unproblematic manner.

What I also want to talk of, is how, in the creation of such shared 'worlds', everyone's voice can count; that is, how the 'world' created can be accounted by everyone within it as 'my world', the 'world-I-am-at-home-in', rather than as an alien world, the world of 'those others'.

Further, I want to talk of how we can talk of these issues - and in particular, of the part played by other peoples' envoiced activities within them - in such a way that we do so simply as just one of the envoiced bodies participating in such a shared world, without tending to privatize or to appropriate its resources to a world of our own, elite, invention.

And let me add here, that crucial to my work is, not only the work of the later Wittgenstein (1953), but also the work of Vygotsky (1978, 1986) and Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986, 1993), as well as, in a more ancillary way, the work of Garfinkel (1967), Goffman (1959), Mead (1934), and Vico (1968). All of these people, in their own way, have focused on our communicative activities as beginning, not in events inside the heads of individuals, but in the living, practical, bodily activities going on between people, and between people and their surroundings. Let me quote Wittgenstein (1980a) on this:

"The origin and primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language - I want to say - is a refinement, 'in the beginning was the deed'[Goethe]" (p.31).

"Not what one man is doing now, but the whole hurly-burly, is the background against which we see an action, and it determines our judgment, our concepts, and our reactions" (1980, II, no.629).

"We sensitively catch the smallest shift in intonation, the slightest interruption of voices in anything of importance to us in another person's practical everyday discourse. All those verbal sideward glances, reservations, loopholes, hints, thrusts do not slip past our ear, are not foreign to our own lips" (p.201).

"Even if I know a given person thoroughly, and I also know myself, I still have to grasp the truth of the unitary and unique event which links us, and in which we are participants" (Bakhtin, 1993, p.17).

Locating ourselves in such 'living moments' with the others around us - rather than relating ourselves to them from within a theoretical schematism of our own devising - is crucial, and I will say more about this in a moment below, when I come to talk about styles of writing and the stances we can adopt towards those we write of, or about. But here, let me just remark that, if we are to engage with each other, as unique, living, and responsible individuals in ways appropriate to the actual nature of our uniquely shared circumstances, we must not locate ourselves in generalized abstractions. If we do, if we try to live by putting theories into practice, or by trying to follow explicitly formulated principles, then we shall find ourselves living out, not our own lives, but lives set out for us by the original authors of the abstractions in question.

But what is involved in engaging ourselves in such 'living moments'? To grasp that, we must, I think, first grasp the general nature of dialogical phenomena.
 

- We cannot not be responsive both to those around us and to other aspects of our surroundings.
- When a second living human being responds to the activities of a first, then what is done by the second cannot be accounted as wholly their own activity - for the second acts in a way that is partly 'shaped' by the first (and the first's acts were responsive also)... this is where all the strangeness of the dialogical begins ("joint action" - Shotter, 1984, 1993a and b).
- What is produced in such dialogical exchanges is a very complex mixture of not wholly reconcilable influences - as Bakhtin (1981) remarks, both 'centripetal' tendencies inward toward order and unity are at work, as well as 'centrifugal' ones outward toward diversity and difference.
- Further, because the overall outcome of any exchange cannot be traced back to the intentions of any of the individuals involved, the 'dialogical reality or space' constructed between them is experienced as an 'external reality' or a 'third agency' with its own (ethical) demands and requirements.
- Thus, such activity is not simply action (for it is not done by individuals; and cannot be explained by giving people's reasons), nor is it simply behavior (to be explained as a regularity in terms of its causal principles); it constitutes a distinct, third sphere of activity with its own distinctive properties.
- This third sphere of activity involves a special kind of nonrepresentational, sensuous or embodied form of practical-moral (Bernstein, 1983) understanding, which, in being constitutive of people's social and personal identities, is prior to and determines all the other ways of knowing available to us.
- Activities in this sphere lack specificity; they are only partially determined.
- Indeed, it is precisely their lack of any pre-determined order, and thus their openness to being specified or determined by those involved in them, in practice - while usually remaining quite unaware of having done so - that is their central defining feature. And: it is precisely this that makes this sphere of activity interesting... for at least two reasons: 1) to do with practical investigations into how people actually do manage to 'work things out'; and 2) to do with the ways available to us for talking of what goes on within such a sphere of activity.
- It is only from within a living involvement in such an ongoing flow of dialogical activity, that we can make sense of what is occurring around us.
- As a result of our socialialization into such dialogical activity-flows, we develop background, practical, relational-responsive forms of understanding of how to 'go on' within them - such 'cultural' forms of understanding are constitutive of what counts for us as the significant, stable and repeatable forms within that flow.
 

- It is in variations within such flows of constitutive (repetitive, ritual) activity, that we can express ourselves, our own 'inner lives', our 'position' in the larger schemes of things constituted in the flows of social activity in which we are 'rooted' and have our being - Helen Keller, for instance, was reputed to be able to recognize people from their handshake alone (remember that she was blind and deaf) for up to two years after one meeting with them.
- Without the continual emersion in such a background flow of dialogically responsive activity occurring between us and both the others around us and the rest of our surroundings, we simply could not be the kind of self-conscious, rational and autonomous individuals that we are. We can say that our involvement in its flow is constitutive of the kind of person we are, culturally and historically. While its "specific variability" (Volosinov, 1986, p.69) is what allows us to express our own unique meanings from within it.
- It is in the specific variabilities that it allows that we can express our own unique position in existence. And the basic task of those around us - who must understand the unique way in which things are for us - "does not basically amount to recognizing the form used, but rather to understanding it in a particular context... i.e., it amounts to understanding its novelty and not to recognizing its identity" (Volosinov, 1973, p.68).

What is important to us in our lives together then, are fleeting, one-off, unique, unrepeatable events, events that occur, as Garfinkel (1967) so wonderfully puts it, for yet "another first time" (p.9), or, only "once-occurrent events of Being," as Bakhtin (1993, p.2) calls them.

A broad movement is currently afoot (and has been so for some time now), not only in Academic Psychology, but in Social Theory at large. It is something to do with attempting within the Academy to overcome the lifelessness of the humane and social disciplines: It is to do with resurrecting what has until now been treated as-if-dead: people! The movement can be formulated in many different ways:

- some might suggest that it constitutes an interpretative, linguistic, hermeneutical, or discursive turn;
- others are calling it a turn to social constructionism or rhetoric;
- while yet others call it a move to relational or dialogical formulations;
- or, a move to the recognition of the importance of others, of Othernesses, and of difference and differences;
- or, to an appreciation of non-representational or expressivist notions of meaning;
- or, a move from centering our studies in thought to a focus on people's activities, a shift from focusing on individuals to a focus on the social;
- or, a turn away from rooting claims to knowledge in abstract theory toward basing them in our social practices;
- or, a turning away from universal principles toward a study of the concrete details of our social exchanges;
- or, a growing interest in embodiment;
- or, a return to values, to ethics, to a concern with what matters.

Finally, it constitutes an interest in what we might call agent's knowledge (Taylor, 1985, p.80), a form of knowledge 'shown', 'manifested', or 'carried' in action, rather than in supposed 'inner mental representations', available only to uninvolved, disinterested, external observers, as in the classical view.

We are even beginning to see a role for the disorderly, the chaotic, and the playful, and to find events on the boundaries between our activities as perhaps more interesting than those occurring at their centers (cf: Chaos Theory).

Whatever... the puzzle now, is how to account for our lives together as an unfolding, never fully complete, living movement of some kind - with, as we have already seen, meanings, and the understanding of meanings, as being 'shown' in such movements in some way. We need what I shall call, relational-responsive forms of understanding, rather than our current referential-representational forms, if we are to grasp the nature of lived lives in practice.
 

- Bakhtin (1993) mentions the importance of us acting from within only "once occurrent" events, for it is only from within such events that we can influence the flow of events that influence us.
- In talking or thinking 'about' something, we attempt to 'picture' it as if 'over there', as distinct and separate from ourselves, as something in which we are not involved.
- We look back on it as something already complete in itself; we do not talk 'of' it as being currently 'present', such that our talk 'of' it influences its very nature, here and now.
- Talk 'about' something lacks 'immediacy'.
- Bakhtin (1993) remarks, that in its uniqueness: "[The] once-occurrent event of Being is no longer something that is thought of, but something that is, something that is being actually and inescapably accomplished through me and others...; it is actually experienced, affirmed in an emotional-volitional manner, and cognition constitutes merely a moment in this experiencing-affirming. Once-occurrent uniqueness or singularity cannot be thought of, it can only be participatively experienced and lived through" (p.13).
- Similarly, Wittgenstein (1981) remarks about the nature of such events: "...the difficulty - I might say - is not that of finding [a] solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it... This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our [dialogical] considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it. The difficulty here is: to stop" (1981, no.314, my alteration, addition, and emphasis).
- It is the uniqueness of such events that is eradicated in our current, theoretical approaches, in which we want to see everything as a manifestation of an already existing law or principle.
- "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is being played" (Wittgenstein, 1953, no.654).
- Bernstein (1992) points out - in noting, as he calls it, the current "rage against reason" - it is precisely unique, relationally responsive events of this kind, that our current referential-representational forms of rationality render invisible, and exclude from both rational discussion and attention.
- We are required to respond to the unique events within which people reveal their own 'worlds' to us, as if they must be explained - instead, we want to be able, relationally, to 'place' their actions, to know 'where they are coming from', where they are 'trying to get to', thus 'to find out feet' with them.
- Like Bernstein, Bakhtin (1984) also notes how the "orientation toward unity" results in "a whole series of phenomena" remaining "almost entirely beyond the realm of consideration," especially those "that are determined by its dialogic orientation" (pp.274-275).
- And elsewhere, he remarks (Bakhtin, 1993): "To those who wish and know how to think participatively (see note * immediately below), it seems that philosophy, which ought to resolve ultimate problems (i.e., which poses problems in the context of unity and unique Being in its entirety), fails to speak of what it ought to speak. Even though its propositions have a certain validity, they are incapable of determining an answerable act/deed and the world in which it is actually and answerably performed once and only once" (p.19).
- (note *) "That is, those who know how not to detach their performed act from its product, but rather how to relate both of them to the unitary and unique context of life and seek to determine them in that indivisible unity" (Bakhtin, 1993, p.19).
- What is difficult for us to grasp here, is the nature of the practical-moral meanings that are revealed to us in our activities as we go along, the meanings which we, in our ways of responding to an other's activities, we ourselves construct... for they are only sensed or felt meanings!
- George Steiner (1989) raises what he writes of as a fundamental question of the moment: "that of the presence or absence in our individual lives and in the politics of our social being, of poiesis, of the act and experienced act of creation in the full sense" (p.23).
- In eradicating from our lives, the importance of first-time, only once-occurrent, creative events, we are prevented from gaining access to those shared moments in which we could create new forms of life for ourselves - instead, we are condemned merely to elaborate those already in existence: mostly anti-democratic, corporate forms of 'administered' life (Saul, 1995).
 

- "It might almost be said," Wittgenstein (1981) claims: "'Meaning moves, whereas a process stands still'" (no.237).
- Instead of meaning being a cognitive process of statically 'picturing' something, Wittgenstein sees it in a much more practical and dynamic light: as part of an unfolding, ongoing, interactive process in which people as embodied agents, are continually reacting both to each other and to their circumstances - here, a failure to understand, is a failure in knowing how to 'go on' with someone, of not knowing one's 'way about', of having 'lost our footing' with them.
- Even as a person is speaking, the bodily and facial responses of the others around them to what they say, are acting back upon them to influence them moment by moment in their 'shaping' of their talk as it unfolds.
- In other words, people's 'inner lives' - what traditional psychological try to talk of in terms our 'inner psychological states' - are 'displayed in' or 'carried in' the uniquely distinctive ways in which we make use of the normatively identical forms of our language in our language-activities.
- In yet other words, our inner lives are not so much inside us geographically, so to speak, as 'in' the temporal unfolding of those of our activities in which we relate ourselves to our surroundings - which, of course, are out in the world for us all to see, if only we can become responsive to them.
- The term, 'real presences', is Steiner's (1989) term for the 'unfolding movement of meaning' present in a work of art.
- As he says about his sense of their nature: "These convictions are, as current linguistic philosophy puts it - when it is being polite - 'verification transcendent'. They cannot be logically, formally or evidentially proved" (p.214).

"But... I am wagering, both in a Cartesian and Pascalian vein, on the informing pressure of a real presence in the semantic markers which generate Oedipus the King or Madame Bovary; in the pigments or incisions which externalize Grunewald's Issenhein triptych or Brancussi's Bird; in the notes, crochets, markings of tempo and volume which actualize Schubert's posthumous Quintet. Generation, externalization, actualization: these are abstract verbalizations of primary comings into being of energized and signifying from within" (p.215).

Indeed, as Wittgenstein (1953) remarks about his own efforts to order the results of his investigations into an ordered whole:

"After several unsuccessful efforts to weld my results into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. - And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide filed of thought criss-cross in very direction. - The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings" (p.v).

- So: in looking over an arrangement of sketches in an album, Wittgenstein thought, one could come to a kind of picture of a whole landscape. How could this be? What does he mean here?
- Here we must turn to a crucial aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy: its 'poetic' character.
 

"... philosophy ought really to be written only as a poetic composition" (1980, p.24).

- i) gather examples ("don't think, but look!" (Wittgenstein, 1953, no.66).
- ii) deconstruction in practice: 'stop' 'look', 'listen to this', 'look at that' (pointing out features of the flow from within the flow) (1953, nos 132, 144).
- iii) use new metaphors to reveal new possibilities in events hidden by the dead metaphors in routine forms of talk (1953, no.115).
- iv) make comparisons using (sometimes invented) "objects of comparison" (1953, no.130) to establish an order... not the order in our knowledge.

All to arrive at a form of understanding which "consists in 'seeing connections'" (1953, no.122) - what I have called a dialogical, relational-responsive form of practical-moral understanding.
 
 

As we see it, there are two quite different styles of speaking and writing within which we, as academics, relate to the people around us:

- i) Professional: one way is the supposedly 'objective', 'realistic', 'formal' or 'professional' style of speech or writing within which we currently present to our colleagues, the theories and the true facts our studies are meant to reveal;
- ii) Conversational: the other is a more 'informal' or 'conversational' style that, traditionally, is thought to be in tension with it.

They each involve the adoption of a quite different relational stance, i.e., a different set of both methodological and ethical commitments, not only to those to whom we address ourselves, but also to the supposed subject matter of our talk.

- i) Cognitive: While the former works in terms of us understanding them intellectually, as if from afar, in terms of representations, i.e., in terms of supposed similarities of form.
- ii) Intuitional: The latter works in terms of us sensing in our living, embodied relations with them, up close, differences, differences that arise as they respond to our actions with actions of their own, differences that, initially at least, we can only voice poetically and metaphorically.

In other words, in the second, our understanding of other people comes about through a quite different route than that through which we understand them in the first: it comes about dialogically, in a way which we are all responsive in a living, embodied way to each other, and in which the others can respond back to us in way denied them in the first.

- i) Closed: While the first way of talking, in which people relate themselves to each other cognitively and intellectually, can be thought of as a closed, finalized, monologic way of talking, functioning in an already existing and sustained 'disciplinary space', making use of fixed and finalized concepts.
- ii) Open: The other, in which people are in a more sensuous contact with each other, is an open, unfinalized, responsive form of talk in which new 'spaces' may be opened up, and others closed down, freely, moment by moment.

Until recently, this second, nonconceptual, nonrepresentational, nondisciplinary, everyday form of talk has been very unfamiliar to us. We have been captivated by the picture of ourselves as isolated individuals, inhabiting an otherwise inert, mechanical body that, as a 'mind' we, so to speak, 'animate'.

But let us turn now to how our methodological and ethical involvements with each other, both with those we study as well as our professional colleagues, are played out in these two different styles of writing and talking:

- i) Monological-retrospective-objective writing: In our official, academic style, we would be talking/writing to you as fellow professional academics, about what happened earlier, when we were involved with those whose activity is now the topic of our talk. We would provide you with a linguistic representation of the nature of that activity, but now from outside that involvement, looking back upon it as a completed process. In separating the activity from the people whose activity it was, and from its surrounding circumstances, we would be separating it from the practical part it played in their lives, its point from them. But this is not our concern. Our concern is with what logically 'can be said' about the patterning or form of that activity, an order that we can claim to have 'discovered' in it. We shall call this kind of writing, monological-retrospective-objective writing. Here, what we say or write is located in our professional relationship and is directed toward identifying that to which, as professional observers with a certain set of professional methodological commitments, we should attend. It is aimed at producing explanatory theories, i.e., representations of states of affairs that enable those in possession of them to predict and control the events they represent.

- ii) Dialogical-prospective-relational writing: In the other style, we would be talking/writing to you of the character of our ongoing involvements with certain other people, from within that involvement - while both looking back on what had been achieved so far, and forward prospectively, toward the possibilities open to us for our next 'steps'. Our concern in such talk/writing would be with attempting to 'show' or 'make manifest' to you (metaphorically) how you might, justifiably be able to make sense of the character of such involvements. I shall call it dialogical-prospective-relational writing. What I say originates in the interactive relationships from within which I speak, and is directed toward instructing you, as ordinary everyday persons now involved in the relationship in some way (perhaps watching a videotape of it, or reading a transcript, or whatever), in noticing and making within in similar such connections and distinctions.

To contrast with the aim of the previous style, we might say that it is not aimed at explanatory theory, but at providing practical theory, or, at giving what are best called avowal-accounts: account-talk is talk that is useful in a tool-like way to those involved in a situation; it enables those involved to make and to notice differences in their activities, thus affording them with opportunities to coordinate their activities in with each other in an intelligible way.

Thus in these two styles, although you as the addressee of our writing might seem to be the same you, our 'positioning' of you would be different; and our 'ethical stance' toward those who are the 'subject matter' of our talk/writing is quite different too:

- i) Uninvolved writing: In monological-retrospective-objective writing, we would have no need (at least, not immediately) to be accountable or responsive to the absent others of whom we speak. Indeed, we look upon them as if from a distance, as if we have a God's-eye view of them in some way.
- ii) Participatory-involved writing: While in dialogical-prospective-relational writing, as a part of us being involved with those others, we cannot not be accountable to them; we have a sense of our responsibility toward them. And if asked by them as to why we make the claims we do about them, we feel we must respond to their request; we must justify ourselves to them in ways that they can accept (or can give good reasons for rejecting).

- i) Responsibility to colleagues: Thus, in the former style, our first (ethical) responsibilities are to you as a professional reader and to our shared discipline, and we must write in a way justifiably connected with our supposedly shared theoretical interests (as sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, historians, etc.).
- ii) Answerable to those others or an 'otherness': While in the latter style, one of our major responsibilities is toward those others, or othernesses, of whom or of which we speak and write. Thus in this dialogical-prospective-relational writing, we cannot write simply in relation to a fixed and constant theoretical interest; we must write in a way that respects our currently shared but changing conversational or dialogical relations to them, or to 'it', that respects 'who' they 'are' or 'what' it 'is'.

Here, some comments of George Steiner (1989) are relevant: Like Wittgenstein, Steiner also attempts to articulate the nature of understanding in practice, but with respect to art objects - he suggests that here, hermeneutics (our 'readings' of paintings, sculptures, or sonatas) should be thought of as "the enactment of answerable understanding, of active apprehension." For an interpretor is not only a translator between languages, between cultures, but also "an executant, one who 'acts out' the material before him (sic) so as to give it intelligible life" (p.7). And he goes on to state that:

"Interpretative understanding under pressure of enactment I shall, using a dated word, call answerability. The authentic experience of understanding, when we are spoken to by another human being or by a poem, is one of responding responsibility. We are answerable to the text, to the work of art, to the musical offering, in a very specific sense, at once moral, spiritual and psychological" (p.8).

By being full of 'gaps', such writing allows or affords the reader - others - responsive opportunities, opportunities in which to create their own 'bridges' or 'links':

EXAMPLE: "Consider the following circumstances: 1) We encounter an animal in the forest... it turns to us surprised, wide eyed, ears back, our eyes meet... it is 'there' with us... it is a moment of awesome mystery... yet it does have a distinct character, a 'shape' to it, nonetheless. 2) We hold another person in our arms... feel their body respond to our touch... we experience our lover as a source "of ceaselessly unforeseen originality" (to use a phrase of Roland Barthes's, 1983, p.34)... it is a moment of awesome mystery... who are we?... in such a moment... 3) We respond to our circumstances with a gesture... another awesome moment, the beginning of dance... 4) We respond to our circumstances with a sound... it is the mysterious beginning of music... but where are we? in what kind of space?... 5) We respond to events around us with a mark on some material before us... we are startled, we make a zig-zag mark... we are soothed, we make a gentle curve... the beginning of painting... perhaps??"

What I have tried to show above, is that there is a movement afoot to do with an increasing acceptance of what we might call relational-talk, talk to do with persons-in-relation, with participatory events, with engaged or involved agency, and with all of what this might imply for new ways to understand ourselves.

- We seem to be searching for a form of understanding and expression, not just rooted in a "theory of practice" like Bourdieu's (1977, my emphasis), but in the particular, local demands of a practice itself, whatever that practice may be.
- Instead of the classical kind of knowledge, seemingly got from the position of the dis-engaged spectator, we are beginning to wake up to the character of our own involvements in our own ways of knowing; and to what is involved in a knowing from a position of involvement in with the activities we are studying.
- Further, we are beginning to realize that our current ways of expressing our knowledge, our grasp of our circumstances, disconnects us from them, makes it impossible for us to influence them in the course of their ongoing development. We have failed to recognize our own involvement in their fashioning. But, as Heisenberg (1958) remarked some time ago:

"... the objective reality of the elementary particles has been strangely dispersed, not into the fog of some new ill-defined or still unexplained conception of reality, but into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that no longer describes the behavior of the elementary particles but only our knowledge of this behavior" (p.15, my emphasis).

"science always presupposes the existence of man (sic) and we ... must remember that we are not merely observers but also actors on the stage of life" (p.15).

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