Kant, Rosenberg, and the Mirror of Philosophy

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The “Transcendental Deduction” in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is one of the great mirrors of philosophy. By that I mean that there seems to be no steady and unchanging image to be found in that text; each philosopher who approaches it finds in it a reflection of his or her own deepest concerns. 1 Jay Rosenberg’s new book, Accessing Kant: A Relaxed Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason is no exception. 2 Rosenberg lays out a different approach to the central argument of the first Critique from those found in other commentaries. I want to bring out some of the central features of that approach, some of its history, and, finally, raise some questions about how closely his approach might come to Kant’s own intentions.

I

Rosenberg is very conscious of the philosophical context to which Kant responded, especially the dispute between the rationalists and the empiricists that Kant sought to resolve. There are really two distinguishable disputes between rationalists and empiricists. One concerns the nature, origin, and structure of our concepts; the other concerns proper forms or modes of justification. Rosenberg’s first chapter is a description and review of rationalism and empiricism on concepts. His characterization of synthetic apriori judgments as “every-must” judgments is felicitous and welcome; it allows him to cut to the heart of the issues. Classical metaphysics asserted numerous claims that every member of some special class has to have a certain property. Some of these Kant recognized to be indispensable to science and knowledge generally: “Through every change, substance must persist,” “Every event must have a cause,” “The sum of the interior angles of every triangle must be equal to two right angles.” But others were more troublesome; claims that every soul must be simple, immortal, and free, claims about the properties of God (a unique class), and claims about the world-whole (another unique class) played no constitutive role in knowledge or science. Concept Empiricism would have us reject all “every-must” judgments as illegitimate. But with them would go the legitimacy of science and even mathematics. Kant faced the challenge of legitimating just the right ones.

Rosenberg’s treatment of Kant’s approach to this problem of legitimating just the right “every-must” judgments is where I want to focus. The second chapter of the book, on Epistemic Legitimacy is a tour de force, elegantly characterizing not

1 When I teach that text, I give my students a selection of the more well-formulated interpretations of the argument in the Transcendental Deduction. It is a sobering experience for them, for there is so little agreement about the premises, the conclusion, even the fundamental intentions of Kant’s text. Though it risks depressing or discouraging some students, my hope is that it will free them to dare their own interpretation of the text.
2 Jay F. Rosenberg, Accessing Kant: A Relaxed Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Unless otherwise noted, all page references are to this volume.
just the options for the legitimation of nonobservational knowledge employed by Kant’s predecessors, but also those argued about in the early part of the 20th century. Rosenberg shows that Kant’s problematic is still of vital concern.

The problem is two-fold: Since the empiricists had a very thin conception of observation, some nonobservational knowledge, especially the important every-must judgments, must be legitimated if we are to escape a solipsism of the present moment; yet rationalistic excess, an uncritical acceptance of knowledge beyond the bounds of sense, must be avoided. The first hurdle to overcome, therefore, is the skeptical attack on nonobservational knowledge mounted by David Hume. Empiricists like Hume recognize two sources of epistemic warrant: some beliefs have a purely logical warrant. They can be backed up by logically valid deductions from statements that are guaranteed true because they merely express a relation of ideas.

The other source of epistemic warrant is experience. Direct experience carries its warrant with it, it was thought—but what are we to make of claims that are indirectly tied to experience? Hume was hard-nosed in this regard, and Rosenberg sums up the position in what he calls the “Sophistry and Illusion Corollary”: “If particular nonobservational beliefs of a given sort cannot be logically warranted, then no such beliefs can be warranted at all.” That is, experiential warrant is restricted to the narrow range of direct experience, so any claim that is not a report of direct experience either has logical warrant or has none at all.

There are several “strategic alternatives” Rosenberg canvasses that might allow us to escape the coal pit of skepticism. One is the reductive strategy 20th century empiricists have been especially fond of. If statements about unobservables can be reduced to or translated into statements about observables, then we can save our knowledge of such unobservables. Reductions of statements about, e.g., material objects, psychological states, and theoretical entities have all been attempted, and the consensus seems to be that they do not work, indeed, that they cannot work.

The other alternative is to try to expand the rather narrow confines of the kinds of warrant recognized. We could maintain that there are forms of “non-symptomatic evidence” that are “logically adequate” to warrant certain beliefs even though they do not entail their truth. Strawson’s arguments in Individuals provide the model for such a position. We could, in a different variation, relax our notion of strictly logical warrant, holding not that there are different kinds of evidence beyond the strictly observable, but that there are other kinds of valid inferences to use in deriving nonobservational beliefs from observations. In either case we are adding some third form of sui generis warranting relation to our epistemic arsenal. Such a view, however, “parts company with both the letter and the spirit of neo-Humean empiricism” (p. 46).

Leaving Hume’s dichotomy—logic or experience—behind might seem inevitable. Hume’s principles cannot reconstruct even such a common notion as that of a symptom. “[T]he claim that S is a symptom of N, ...expresses a sort of ‘weak’ synthetic a priori judgment—synthetic because it cannot be logically warranted, but a priori because it cannot be inductively ‘derived from experience’” (p. 47). The Humean empiricist cannot account for the legitimacy of our de facto epistemic practices, which seem to depend on a tacit acceptance of at least weak synthetic a
Is Kant, Rosenberg then asks, another tertium quid rationalist? That is, does Kant adopt this strategy of positing some third form of epistemic warrant relation? Rosenberg thinks a positive answer "would be a disappointing result" (p. 48).

If Kant's transcendental deduction turned out to rest on premises that could be justified only by appealing to a non-logical, non-evidential epistemic tertium quid, it would in essence presuppose the legitimacy of synthetic a priori judgments, i.e., the very epistemic legitimacy that it was ostensibly intended to secure. Kant would then be open to a charge of begging the question or, more charitably, of epistemic dogmatism (p. 48).

Rosenberg means to offer us an alternative according to which Kant turns out to be a "neo-Humean empiricist" (p. 50) able nonetheless to legitimize "every-must" judgments.

II

How does Rosenberg propose to interpret Kant's resolution of the problem? The first part of his proposal is that Kant sees a strategic possibility that his predecessors ignored. Normally, one establishes the legitimacy of a judgment, J, by giving an argument, the conclusion of which is J itself. But this is not the only way to legitimate a judgment, for there can also be arguments to the effect that judgments have certain properties that make them worthy of acceptance. Let's call them warrant-conferring properties. Now, let's say that we're interested in a particular Kantian principle, we'll call it PE, for "principle of experience." The proposition that PE has some warrant-conferring property W is clearly a meta-linguistic judgment, one that engages us at the reflective level, not in our first-order engagement with the world. If we have a good argument to the conclusion "PE has W," we then also have all the makings for a practical argument that it is reasonable to adopt or accept PE. The idea that we can reflectively construct an essentially practical argument justifying belief in a theoretical principle is called "Strategy K" by Rosenberg. Schematically, the strategy looks like this:

Unproblematic Premises

\[ \downarrow \]

Principle 'PE' has the significant characteristic

\[ \downarrow \]

It is reasonable to adopt or espouse principle 'PE'.

What is crucial here is that the first move, the argument that PE has some property that confers warrant on it, must itself be acceptable by Humean or Neo-Humean
standards. That is, the premises from which we argue must themselves have logical or direct experiential warrant, and the argument form must be deductive. "Such an application of Strategy K would then give us a new way of bringing reason to bear on questions of epistemic legitimacy, but one that did not presuppose any new form of non-logical and non-evidential epistemic grounding relation" (p. 49).

What kind of warrant-conferring property could a principle of experience possess that would make it reasonable to adopt it? Rosenberg suggests that the property Kant has in mind is that of being true of the world. But a naïve interpretation of that notion must be warded off. Hume has already shown, for instance, that there is no Humeanly acceptable argument to the conclusion that the causal maxim is true of the world. Rather, Rosenberg points out, Kant equates the world with nature and both with the totality of all objects of possible experience (p. 50). Principles of experience have to be shown to be true of the experienceable world by methods acceptable to the neo-Humean.

Rosenberg rightly points out that the unity of experience and the correlative unity of the natural world are important themes in Kant's thought.

Our many separate experiences can be parts of a single comprehensive experience... only if we can validly apply such a priori concepts to objects of our experience and validly endorse the correlative synthetic a priori judgments with respect to them (p. 51).

The deeper point here, though, is that what is the ultimate target of epistemic legitimation, according to Rosenberg, are our epistemic practices of applying concepts and endorsing judgments. "Kant's transcendental deduction is designed to secure the authority of a priori concepts and the synthetic a priori judgments correlative to them by legitimizing our particular epistemic practices with respect to them" (p. 52).

Thus, Rosenberg thinks that the real depth grammar of Kant's transcendental deduction is best formulated as a practical argument supporting our epistemic practices.

If we hold to the natural and dominant paradigm of practical arguments, a transcendental deduction will then take on the general form of a piece of means-ends reasoning, in which the reasonableness of adopting or espousing a given principle is derived from a consideration of its unique role in realizing an end that we in fact have:

1. We shall achieve (a particular end) E*.
2. A good way (the best way, the only way) to achieve E* is to accept principles that have the significant characteristic Φ.
3. The (candidate first) principle 'P' has significant characteristic Φ.
4. So, we shall accept the principle 'P' (p. 52).

We've seen that the "significant characteristic Φ" is "applying to or being true of the experienceable world," but what could the end E* be? It would have to be some end that is not optional, some end that every knower or experiencer shares.
Rosenberg's answer is that, given the fact that we are sensorily passive, temporally discursive apperceptive intelligences, E* is the ability to think of oneself as a unitary subject of thought and experience.

For my being able to think of myself as the single subject of many thoughts and experiences is not one of my optional ends, i.e., one that I might freely choose either to adopt or to eschew. It is, so to speak, a constitutive end. My doing so is a condition of there being an "I"—one active agent—who is able to consider and choose at all, among many optional ends (p. 59).

Rosenberg's discussion of the synthetic unity of experience is richly textured and illuminating on many levels. For present purposes, however, we can turn directly to the final state of Rosenberg's reconstruction of the transcendental deduction, which looks like this:

1. We shall be able to think of ourselves as the unitary subjects of our diverse thoughts and experiences.
2. The only way to achieve this is by deploying principles for combining temporally disjoint individual experiences into a unitary comprehensive experience.
3. The synthetic a priori judgments...express just such principles of experiential unification.
4. So, we shall endorse the synthetic a priori judgments...and thereby apply the a priori concepts (p. 58).

III

Before turning to consider whether Rosenberg's interpretation of the basic structure of Kant's transcendental deduction is convincing, I'd like to pause for a moment of historical context. Rosenberg's, that is, not Kant's. Here's a question from the final exam in Wilfrid Sellars's Kant course:


1. Kant's premises are proposed as analytic, in which case, if sound, his conclusions must be analytic and hence empty; or
2. his premises are proposed as synthetic a priori, in which case he is begging the question; or
3. his premises are proposed as synthetic a posteriori, in which case, if sound, his conclusions must be empirical hypotheses.
Discuss.

This is just the trilemma Rosenberg gives us. Chapter Two of Jay's book is the answer to Sellars's Kant exam that I assume Jay pondered for 40 years.

But the influence of Sellars runs much deeper than this. Strategy K could as well be called Strategy S, for it is exactly the strategy by which Sellars proposes to justify first principles. In his article "On Accepting First Principles," Sellars offers
us the following schema for a practical argument to justify accepting a theory\(^1\)

\[(A_1)\]

We shall bring about \(E\).

Bringing about \(E\) implies accepting \(Ts\) which are \(\phi\).

\(T_1\) is \(\phi\).

Therefore, we shall accept \(T_1\) (OAFP \(\&\) 24: 449).\(^4\)

This is the model Rosenberg appropriated to explain what Kant had in mind in the transcendental deduction, Kant's own attempt to justify first principles. In that Sellars article and especially its major companion, "Induction as Vindication," Sellars works out a complex structural analysis of the reasoning behind accepting ampliative, nonobservational claims, whether at the level of individual generalizations or whole theories. As portrayed by Sellars, we should note, this strategy is tied to a robust notion of induction and justifying the probability of theories.

Thus, Rosenberg's interpretation of Kant's transcendental deduction is deeply Sellarsian. This is no surprise. But it is arguably more deeply Sellarsian than Sellars's own interpretation of Kant. And I think this points us towards some questions that need to be raised about the fidelity of Rosenberg's interpretation to Kant's self-conception.

IV

One possible objection I already hinted at is that the context in which Sellars develops the notions that Rosenberg has borrowed is that of explaining and defending the rationality of inductive argument. He uses the practical argument form at issue to discuss the rationality of accepting empirical generalizations and scientific theories, for instance. The notion of probability plays a large role in these discussions, for in Sellars's view empirical acceptation is pretty much always a matter of playing the odds. Sellars tells us that statements of the form "It is probable that \(p\)" are (more or less) material mode metalinguistic claims to the effect that there is a good practical argument available with "I shall accept \(p\)" as its conclusion. Applied to Rosenberg's interpretation of Kant's argument, it would seem that the ultimate theoretical conclusion is that it is probable that every event must have a cause, even though the

\(^1\) I shall cite Sellars's works in the text using the standard abbreviations. Full citations can be found in the Works Cited list at the end of this essay.

\(^4\) Sellars's treatment in IV is more detailed, but the pattern Rosenberg employs is clearly distinguishable in passages such as:

In short, the major premise of the first order probability argument tells us that the complete practical reasoning which culminates in

\[
\text{I shall accept } h
\]

(where this acceptance is bound up with probability \(\mu^p\)) has the form

\[
\text{I shall bring about } E
\]

(but bringing about \(E\) implies accepting a proposition, if it satisfies condition \(C\))

So, I shall accept a proposition, if it satisfies condition \(C\)

\(h\) satisfies condition \(C\)

So, I shall accept \(h\). (IV 207-8)
practical conclusion is simply accepting the principle (now construed as an inference license) that every event has a cause and operating our epistemic practices on that basis. Now, it seems obvious that Kant had no intention of establishing only the probability of the causal maxim or the permanence of substance.

I do not think this objection, however, is a serious one. In the original context in which Sellars developed these notions (that of explaining the rationality of empirical theory acceptance), the warrant-conferring property in question does not confer conclusive warrant. But the warrant-conferring property that Rosenberg has in mind (being necessary for combining temporally disjoint individual experiences into a unitary comprehensive experience) would afford a conclusive warrant for the principles it applies to, if the argument attributing that property is a good one. The modifier “it is probable that” seems to be appropriate where the reasoning that ultimately stands behind the acceptance of the claim is not conclusive. The principles that apply to every possible experience and therefore to every possible theory will have to have a stronger warrant than that of any particular empirical theory.

Still, I think there is a problem in applying Strategy K to Kant; we need to push deeper to see where it lies.

The text-book answer to Sellars’s final exam question, and the one I thought I learned in Sellars’s Kant course, uses only a part of Rosenberg’s Strategy K. It does recognize that the synthetic a priori judgments or principles that Kant wants to justify are embedded in some sense in another, essentially more complex judgment that can be given a straightforward logical warrant; these more complex judgments turn out to be simply analytic. But, the standard view goes, the more complex embedding judgment is not a metalinguistic or metaconceptual judgment about the warrant-conferring properties of the candidate synthetic a priori principle. Instead, the embedding judgment possesses a subject term in which a specific condition is made explicit, namely, the condition that the judgment is concerned only with objects of possible experience. As Kant remarks at A27/B43 “If we add the limitation of a judgment to the concept of the subject, then the judgment is unconditionally valid.” Thus, the standard answer is that what Kant actually gives us are analytical arguments with conclusions such as “Every event that is humanly experienceable must have a cause,” and “Through every change that is humanly experienceable, substance must persist.” Kant holds that the concept of cause is not contained in the concept of event, nor is the concept of substance contained in the concept of change. But the concept of cause is contained in the concept of an event that is experienceable by something with a human’s sensory/cognitive architecture. Kant is engaged in philosophical analysis. When we extract the explicit limitation from the concepts of their subjects, however, we are left with judgments that are no longer simply analytically true, although they can be known to be true, and necessarily so, of all experience, that is, in every sensible application.

The differences between the standard view of Kant I have just adumbrated and Rosenberg’s strategy K are

1 Citations to the Critique of Pure Reason use the standard citation form: “A” for the page in the first edition, and “B” for the second edition. All reputable versions of the Critique mark the A/B pages.
Strategy K employs explicitly metalinguistic or metaconceptual concepts and principles in the argument it generates;
(2) Strategy K is an explicitly practical argument that aims at justifying a
doing, rather than a truth simpliciter.

I want to argue now that, while (1) is not a difference that makes a difference, I fear that (2) is. I have doubts that Kant ought to be construed as that much of a pragmatist, however much he provided the soil out of which pragmatism grew.

I do not believe that the explicitly “meta”-quality of Rosenberg’s Strategy K is a roadblock to its being truly Kantian, because, though Kant did not have available to him the distinctions between object-language and meta-language now so familiar to us, there are several aspects of his philosophy that show him to be on the verge of making a functionally similar distinction concerning concepts. I will mention only one, because it is such a systematic aspect of Kant’s philosophy that I think it carries the weight all by itself. Kant’s treatment of the relation between understanding and reason encourages us to think of understanding as a first-order, object-oriented faculty to which reason’s higher-order, meta-conceptual activity stands in contrast. The proper job of reason is to organize and systematize the products of the understanding. It is reason that is responsible for the justification or legitimation of the principles of experience, even if it is the understanding’s responsibility to employ them. The explicitly meta-linguistic formulation of Strategy K, in my view, only brings to the surface structural features already present in Kant’s architectonic. 6

But the fact that Strategy K employs an explicitly practical argument troubles me. First, something seems odd to me about the end towards which, in Rosenberg’s portrayal of Kant’s deduction, we are supposed to be aiming. “We shall be able to think of ourselves as the unitary subjects of our diverse thoughts and experiences.” It seems odd, because, for one thing, this is an end that one could have only if one has already achieved it (at least so far). A subject who could not (yet) think of herself as a unitary subject of diverse thoughts and experiences would not be able to formulate or possess such an intention. That’s not itself an objection: only someone who has so far successfully survived could have the goal of survival; only someone who has already learned a language could justify the acquisition of a language. But it is not impossible to justify either surviving or learning a language. Justifications are often higher-order and often retrospective.

However, the oddness of the intention to think of oneself as a unitary subject is reinforced by the fact that it is not the kind of intention one normally knows how to go about acting on. We know how to act on the intention to survive, and even the intention to learn a language, that is, either improving one’s facility in the first language already in hand or to learn a second language. But how does one seek to obey an injunction to make oneself capable of thinking of oneself as a unitary subject of diverse experiences? Is there any other response than “Well, I already am capable of

6 Thus we can see that Sellars’s ontological nominalism and psychological nominalism stand to the Platonisms of Russell, Moore, and Bergmann as Kant’s critical philosophy stood to the rationalisms of Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff.
that, so I guess I'll just keep doing what I do"? Part of the point is that, as a preconditions of action, it is not something one either can or needs to focus on as something yet to do. Perhaps these worries about the first premise of the practical argument for the acceptance of the principles of experience can be deftly turned aside by simply recognizing that talk of "accepting," even "endorsing" a principle sounds (by conversational implicature, I suppose) as if the principle is somehow new or not yet always already a structural feature of one's cognition. What we're doing in such an argument, really, is acknowledging the principles that are implicit in our epistemic practices. We are acknowledging these principles as already in place and essential to our past and our continued existence as cognitive beings.

But in that case, perhaps the right intention is nothing so fancy as "We shall be able to think of ourselves as the unitary subjects of our diverse thoughts and experiences." Perhaps it is simply "I shall know my world" or "I shall seek knowledge," or even just "I shall think". The analysis of the nature and conditions of thought and knowledge would lead us then to see the importance of the unity of experience and how it, in turn, demands and justifies a belief in lawful regularity and orderliness in the world known.

Worries about the identity of the correct epistemic end in terms of which our acceptance or acknowledgment of the principles of experience is to be legitimated is not my principal concern with Rosenberg's strategy. My biggest worry is that Rosenberg would clearly make it the case that the legitimacy of the categories and the principles of the understanding is a practical legitimacy. This is a concern because the Kantian system the practical realm is, strictly speaking, beyond our knowledge. After all, Kant has denied knowledge to make room for faith. That can be said in a way that makes it sound magnanimous—aren't we broad minded and generous to allow faith territory of its own? But it is not, ultimately, an act of magnanimity, for knowledge cannot take us everywhere we'd really like to go, in Kant's eyes. There is a realm we would desperately like to know, but in which we can rely only upon faith. One object of faith beyond the realm of knowledge is our very agency. Kant thinks we cannot help but think of ourselves as rational agents freely acting for reasons, and to this extent, there is a kind of legitimacy to such beliefs. But he is bound, on his own principles, to deny that we know that we are free, that we are, in fact, rational agents, that we act for reasons and not merely from inclination.

Kant thinks there are compelling practical considerations for believing that we are rational beings, that we are free, that we have immortal souls, etc., yet denies systematically that we can be said, properly speaking, to know any of these things. These are claims that Kant believed to be true and believed we were justified in espousing, yet denied we could know. Thus, practical justification seems to be, for Kant, systemically distinct from epistemic justification. There may well be an argument to show that the purely practical interest we have in being free, rational beings with immortal souls ruled by a just God operates in a different way from the theoretical interest we have in thinking and knowledge. But it is certainly the case that our rationality is of no less interest to us as theoretical beings, as knowers, than it is to us as practical beings, as agents. Kant wrote an essay against the idea that something
may be true in theory but not apply in practice.\footnote{See Kant's 1793 essay, 'On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice', in Kant, \textit{Practical Philosophy}, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996).} Rosenberg, however, is suggesting something quite different, namely, if something applies in practice, it will be true in theory—at least, if “applies in practice” is appropriately constrained. But Kant could not see how to bridge the gap, he does not give us an argument for connecting practice and theory in this way. Kant draws a very significant line between theory—what we can know—and practice—which is ultimately not even in the realm of the knowable.

There are themes in Kant that Rosenberg can mobilize to minimize the problem. Kant proclaims the unity of reason, at least as a regulative idea, and even the primacy of practical reason.

\begin{quote}
Denn Philosophie in der letztem Bedeutung ist ja die Wissenschaft der Beziehung alles Erkenntnisses und Vernunftgebrauchs auf den Endzwecke der menschlichen Vernunft, dem, als dem obersten, alle andern Zwecke subordinirt sind und sich in ihm zur Einheit vereinigen müssen (Logik, Ak IX: 24).\footnote{As is standard, I cite the volume and page in the \textit{Akademie Ausgabe} of Kant's works. “For, in the latter meaning, philosophy is the science of relating all cognition and every use of reason to the ultimate end of human reason, to which, as the supreme end, all others are subordinated and in which they must be joined into unity” Hartman & Schwartz Translation (Bobbs-Merrill, 1974) p. 28.}
\end{quote}

But the unity of reason is something Kant claims needs to be demonstrated, and thus cannot be assumed to help us bridge the gap between practical reason and theoretical reason.\footnote{See, for instance, Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason.” \textit{Review of Metaphysics} 52 (December 1998): 311-339.} The primacy of practical reason, in the context of Kant’s philosophy, leads to a theoretical humility that encouraged people like Hegel to fault Kant for allowing us only the appearance of knowledge, not real knowledge itself. I am not convinced that either of these approaches will leave Rosenberg with the successful response to Hume he’s looking for.

Sellars himself expressed the problem cogently when he says that Kant’s views challenge us “to come up with a concept of nature which not only finds a place for \textit{reason} and the \textit{causality of reason} (tasks which any naturalist will undertake), but also for the \textit{autonomy of reason} and the \textit{reality of the moral point of view}” (I (“...this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks...,”), \textit{Kant’s Theory of Mind}, 1993) p. 87, KTM: 362). As I read him, Sellars did not think Kant was successful in this project, because Kant displaced the causality and autonomy of reason and the reality of the moral point of view into the unknowable in-itself, outside of the nature in which we live and have our being. I am therefore suspicious of Rosenberg’s overly Sellarsian Kant, because the attempt to ground theory and knowledge in practice and agency seems to me to violate a major architectonic structure of the Kantian system.

The distinction between the phenomenal, Newtonianly deterministic world we experience and can come to know and the noumenal world of things as they are in themselves, which faith licenses us to believe is a world in which we are free and...
rational souls, is architecturally indispensable in Kant’s thought. It has also made almost every reader of Kant since Jacobi at least uncomfortable, if not mildly crazy. My own sympathies are to wish that Rosenberg’s reconstruction of Kant’s deduction captured Kant’s intentions perfectly. The move towards a more thoroughgoing pragmatism it embodies seems just the right move to me. But pragmatism got its start from the urge to overcome the dualisms frozen in Kant’s system. Making Kant a neo-pragmatist may make him more attractive, but I fear it also makes him less Kantian.

References


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